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Abstract
Human probability judgments are systematically biased, in apparent tension with
Bayesian models of cognition. But perhaps the brain does not represent probabilities
explicitly, but approximates probabilistic calculations through a process of sampling, as
used in computational probabilistic models in statistics. Naïve probability estimates can
be obtained by calculating the relative frequency of an event within a sample, but these
estimates tend to be extreme when the sample size is small. We propose instead that
people use a generic prior to improve the accuracy of their probability estimates based
on samples, and we call this model the Bayesian sampler. The Bayesian sampler trades
off the coherence of probabilistic judgments for improved accuracy, and provides a
single framework for explaining phenomena associated with diverse biases and heuristics
such as conservatism and the conjunction fallacy. The approach turns out to provide a
rational reinterpretation of “noise” in an important recent model of probability
judgment, the probability theory plus noise model (Costello & Watts, 2014, 2016a, 2017,
2019; Costello, Watts, & Fisher, 2018), making equivalent average predictions for simple
events, conjunctions, and disjunctions. The Bayesian sampler does, however, make
distinct predictions for conditional probabilities and distributions of probability
estimates. We show in two new experiments that this model better captures these mean
judgments both qualitatively and quantitatively; which model best fits individual
distributions of responses depends on the assumed size of the cognitive sample.
Keywords: sampling, approximation, heuristics, biases, availability,
representativeness, conservatism, Bayes, noise
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A Rational Model of Probability Judgment
Human probability judgments appear to be systematically biased, apparently
suggesting that human probabilistic reasoning is not based on normative Bayesian
principles, but instead on heuristic approximations of various kinds (e.g., Gigerenzer &
Gaissmaier, 2011; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). The large literature on the psychology
of human probabilistic judgment has therefore emphasized human irrationality,
demonstrating that these judgments are incoherent, in the sense that they do not relate
to one another as required by probability theory.
Yet this research tradition appears to stand in sharp contrast with the prevalence
and usefulness of Bayesian models across the cognitive and brain sciences, ranging over
perception (Gershman, Vul, & Tenenbaum, 2009; Knill & Richards, 1996; Yuille &
Kersten, 2006), language processing (Chater & Manning, 2006; Griffiths, Steyvers, &
Tenenbaum, 2007), categorization (Sanborn, Griffiths, & Navarro, 2010), intuitive
physics (Battaglia, Hamrick, & Tenenbaum, 2013; Sanborn, Mansinghka, & Griffiths,
2013), motor control (Wolpert, 2007), and social reasoning (Baker, Jara-Ettinger, Saxe,
& Tenenbaum, 2017). Indeed, the ‘new paradigm’ in the psychology of reasoning (Evans
& Over, 2013; Oaksford & Chater, 2019) even proposes that high-level explicit
reasoning and argumentation is best understood in probabilistic terms (Chater &
Oaksford, 2008; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Oaksford & Chater, 1994).
Thus, we are faced with an apparent paradox: how can Bayesian models of
cognition, and indeed reasoning, be so fruitful, when what we might view as the “basic
element” of such models, human probability judgment, appears to be systematically
biased?
In this paper, we confront this apparent paradox head-on: we develop a Bayesian
model of probability judgment, which operates not through the explicit symbolic
calculation of probabilities, but instead approximates probabilistic inference by drawing
samples from probability distributions. One of the major discoveries of computational
statistics in the last half century is that such sampling models can often efficiently
approximate complex probabilistic distributions (MacKay, 2003; Metropolis,
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Rosenbluth, Rosenbluth, Teller, & Teller, 1953; Robert & Casella, 2013), where symbolic
computation is completely intractable (Aragones, Gilboa, Postlewaite, & Schmeidler,
2005). Such methods are routinely used to approximate probabilistic calculations in
Bayesian machine learning (Craiu & Rosenthal, 2014; Ghahramani, 2015; Neal et al.,
2011), artificial intelligence (Frey, Dayan, & Hinton, 1997), and cognitive science
(Chater & Manning, 2006; Chater & Oaksford, 2008; Tenenbaum, Kemp, Griffiths, &
Goodman, 2011)1. Indeed, such models implement Bayesian inference without explicitly
representing, or manipulating, probabilities (Dasgupta, Schulz, & Gershman, 2017;
Sanborn & Chater, 2016). Inevitably, because sampling models are an approximation to
‘ideal’ probabilistic inference, they will systematically diverge from the norms of
probability theory. In this paper, we show that these departures from probability theory
generate many of the biases observed in human probability judgments. Thus,
apparently paradoxically, a Bayesian rational model can automatically generate many of
the systematic deviations from probability theory observed in experimental data.
Rational Models of Probability Judgment from Sampling
We start from the perspective that people, quite possibly implicitly, have an
internal Bayesian model of the tasks they engage in. The appeal of such a model is that
it carries over some of the normative justification from work on Bayesian models, which
have been successful in cognitive domains as varied as perception, language processing,
categorization, intuitive physics, motor control, and reasoning (Baker et al., 2017;
Battaglia et al., 2013; Chater & Manning, 2006; Chater & Oaksford, 2008; Evans &
Over, 2013; Gershman et al., 2009; Griffiths et al., 2007; Hahn & Oaksford, 2007; Knill
& Richards, 1996; Oaksford & Chater, 1994; Sanborn et al., 2010, 2013; Wolpert, 2007;
1Another family of approximation methods, known as variational Bayes (Blei, Jordan, et al., 2006;
Blei, Kucukelbir, & McAuliffe, 2017), optimizes an approximate, simplified model of the probability
distribution of interest, rather than working with a sample from that distribution. This approach may
also be the starting point for neuroscientific and psychological hypotheses, although we do not consider
it further here (Dasgupta, Schulz, Tenenbaum, & Gershman, 2019; Gershman & Beck, 2017; Ma, Beck,
Latham, & Pouget, 2006; Sanborn, 2017) .
THE BAYESIAN SAMPLER 5
Yuille & Kersten, 2006).
A serious challenge to Bayesian models is that Bayesian calculations (e.g.,
inferring and averaging over the posterior distribution) appear computationally
daunting. We approach this challenge by borrowing standard methods from
computational Bayesian statistics mentioned above: the Bayesian calculations can be
approximated by sampling from the relevant posterior probability distributions, rather
than being computed directly. We have argued elsewhere that this may be the most
appropriate interpretation of many Bayesian psychological models: that the brain is a
Bayesian sampler, but does not represent, or calculate with, probabilities (Sanborn &
Chater, 2016).
How then do people estimate the probability of an event? Aside from restricted
domains with specially designed devices such as coins, dice and roulette wheels, analytic
calculation is typically impossible. We can, though, rely on the recall of past cases, or
our ability to imagine hypothetical cases through a process of mental simulation.
Suppose, for example, we attend an English village fair and wonder how likely we are to
knock a coconut off of a stick in a coconut shy game with a single throw. We can recall
past attempts at the coconut shy, by ourselves and perhaps others; and/or we can
attempt mentally to simulate the process of knocking down the coconut, perhaps using
some kind of intuitive physical model (Battaglia et al., 2013; Hamrick, Smith, Griffiths,
& Vul, 2015; Sanborn et al., 2013). Any given “run” of such a simulation will produce a
particular trajectory of the ball, a collision (or not) with the coconut, and a final
outcome (success or failure). Different runs of the simulation will produce different
results. Thus, by running the simulation many times, we can accumulate a sample of
successes or failures, which may inform our probability judgment.
These two sources of data, memory and simulation, generate a set of specific
instances (whether observed or imagined); and among these instances, the cognitive
system can compare the number of instances in which the event of interest occurs (a
coconut is successfully knocked down) and the number of instances in which it does not
(the coconuts remain in place). As long as these specific instances are generated
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according to the probability of the internal Bayesian model, then sampling provides an
approximation to these often intractable calculations.
Empirical Evidence for the Role of Sampling in Probability Judgment
Before we develop a specific account in more detail, note that the sampling-based
viewpoint gains credibility from links to existing theoretical accounts and empirical
phenomena. For example, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) suggest that one important
heuristic for judging probabilities is availability in memory: that is, events or types
whose instances come readily to mind will be viewed as more probable than those which
do not. They note, for example, that people incorrectly judge that the likelihood that
word begins with a k is higher than that a word has k as its third letter, because it is
easier to retrieve words by their initial letter, rather than its third letter. This
perspective translates naturally into a sampling framework: any factors that impact our
ability to draw mental samples will influence probability judgments.
Differences in the ease of sampling is also one source of conjunction fallacies
(though we focus on another source below). Tversky and Kahneman (1983) asked
participants to estimate the number of words in four pages of a novel that would fit the
pattern _ _ _ _ _ n _ or fit the pattern _ _ _ _ i n g. Participants both estimated
the number of _ _ _ _ i n g words to be higher and found them easier to generate.
That is, items which are more easily mentally sampled are rated as more probable; and
the richer cue provides a better starting point for sampling. While arising naturally
from a sampling viewpoint, these results are, of course, in contradiction to the laws of
probability: all words that fit the _ _ _ _ i n g pattern also fit the _ _ _ _ _ n _
pattern, and hence cannot be more frequent or probable.
The sampling viewpoint also provides a natural explanation of some aspects of
so-called “unpacking” effects. People judge the probability of the “unpacked”
description being a tax, corporate, patent, or other type of lawyer as different from an
equivalent, being a lawyer. The explicitly mentioned “unpacked” elements may provide
a helpful cue to sampling and hence raising probability estimates. By contrast, if the
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unpacked elements are low frequency, then the sampling process may be biased towards
searching for difficult-to-find items, thus lowering probability estimates. Thus, by
biasing the starting point of the sampling process, probability judgments with unpacked
description can be enhanced or reduced, by comparison with the normal descriptions
(Dasgupta et al., 2017; Sanborn & Chater, 2016). This pattern of data is observed
empirically (Dasgupta et al., 2017; Sloman, Rottenstreich, Wisniewski, Hadjichristidis,
& Fox, 2004). We will return to unpacking effects in the discussion.
Finally, the stochastic nature of sampling provides a straightforward explanation
of the variability in human behaviour, such as that seen in probability matching
experiments. As an example, experimental participants might be asked to make one of
two responses, and learn that one response is correct on 70% of trials. Despite the best
strategy being simply choosing the more probable response on every trial, few
participants follow this optimal maximizing strategy. Instead, participants often choose
stochastically, with each response made with a probability close to the probability that
it is correct (Vulkan, 2000). Sampling explains probability matching behavior by
assuming that, on each trial, a person samples a set of responses and picks the most
frequently occurring response in that set. If only a single sample is drawn on each trial,
then responses will be stochastic and will be made according to the probability that
they are correct (Vul, Goodman, Griffiths, & Tenenbaum, 2014). Additionally, sampling
can also explain why experiments show that increased rewards leads to more
maximizing behavior (Shanks, Tunney, & McCarthy, 2002; Vulkan, 2000). If, as seems
natural, participants draw a larger set of samples when rewards are greater, then they
will pick the better response more often – indeed, if participants were to sample a
nearly infinite number of responses, then they will strictly maximize because the better
response would always outnumber the worse response (Vul et al., 2014).
This initial survey indicates that the process of sampling may play an important
role in probability judgments; and understanding the psychological processes of the
sampling process are likely to be of considerable psychological interest. In this paper,
however, our focus is not on the process of sampling, but on the complementary, and
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neglected, question of how frequencies in a mental sample are converted into probability
judgments. We will see that an analysis of this process provides a new mechanism
through which to explain the incoherence in probability judgments.
From Sample Frequencies to Probability Judgments
The question of how sample frequencies should be converted into probability
judgments seems almost trivial: surely, we simply take the relative frequencies (e.g., the
number of throws on which we successfully knock the coconut off the stick divided by
the total number of throws), and identify these as the probabilities. Taken as a
psychological proposal concerning how people form probability judgments, we call this
the relative frequency approach to probability judgment.
We first assume that if people are sampling, then they are (within limits, as
discussed below) generating a new set of random examples each time they answer a
question, which corresponds with the common observation that human behaviour is
stochastic, in psychology, economic, neuroscience, and other fields (Bhatia & Loomes,
2017; Faisal, Selen, & Wolpert, 2008; Vulkan, 2000). Let’s take the example of the
coconut shy mentioned above, and assume that a person asked to make a judgment first
remembers or simulates a single successful example in which they both hit the coconut
and successfully knocked the coconut off the stick:
Throw Hit coconut Knocked coconut off stick
1 Yes Yes
Based on this sample, a person could make any of a variety of judgments using the
relative frequencies. For example, they might judge the probability of the simple event
of the coconut being hit (i.e., PˆRF (hit)), a judgment of the conjunction of the coconut
being hit and being knocked off (i.e., PˆRF (hit ∩ knocked off)), and a judgment of the
conjunction of the coconut being hit but not being knocked off (i.e.,
PˆRF (hit ∩ ¬knocked off)),
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PˆRF (hit) =
Nhit
Nthrown
= 1 (1)
PˆRF (hit ∩ knocked off) = Nhit and knocked off
Nthrown
= 1 (2)
PˆRF (hit ∩ ¬knocked off) = Nhit and not knocked off
Nthrown
= 0 (3)
One rationale for the relative frequency approach is that, assuming judgments are
based on the same set of samples, relative frequencies produces coherent judgments
(e.g., PˆRF (hit) = PˆRF (hit ∩ knocked off) + PˆRF (hit ∩ ¬knocked off) as required by
probability theory in Equations 1-3). Coherence is used to make the normative
argument for following the rules of probability theory: beliefs that follow probability
theory are coherent, and those that do not are subject to exploitation (de Finetti,
1937). A second rationale is that, under certain conditions (e.g., the samples are
independently drawn from fixed distribution), as the sample size tends to infinity, these
relative frequencies will, with high probability, be close to the true probabilities.
Indeed, this is the justification for the frequentist interpretation of probability: that
probabilities are limiting frequencies (Von Mises, 1957).
However, for a sampling agent who draws a more realistic number of samples,
these strengths of relative frequency disappear. First, because it is unrealistic to assume
that people remember or simulate the same set of examples each time they make a
judgment, judgments made via relative frequency will very likely be incoherent (e.g., if
the set of samples used to judge PˆRF (hit ∩ knocked off) are different from those drawn
to judge PˆRF (hit ∩ ¬knocked off), then very often the sum of these judgments will not
equal PˆRF (hit)). While coherence is important for the normative underpinning of
probability theory, it is less important for evaluating how a sampling agent converts
samples into probability estimates, as coherence is not generally achievable for such an
agent.
Second, and relatedly, using relative frequency with a realistic number of samples
will not result in estimates that are close to the correct probabilities. One of the
founders of probability theory, Jacob Bernoulli, estimated that more than 25, 000
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samples are needed for “moral certainty” about the underlying subjective probability of
a binary event, where moral certainty means that, at least 1000:1 odds, the underlying
subjective probability falls within 0.02 of the estimated probability (Stigler, 1986).
Considering a more psychologically plausible number of samples may in fact lead
to uncomfortably extreme judgments if relative frequency is used. Suppose, for
example, we return to the estimate which is based only on one sample,
PˆRF (hit ∩ knocked off). According to the relative frequency approach, we judge this
probability to be 1: that the coconut will always be hit and will always be knocked off
of the stick. Additionally, according to this viewpoint, if we rely on our memories alone,
it is difficult to avoid the prediction that anything that has never happened before will
be judged to have a probability of 0. For example, if I play the lottery with the same
number each week, it is overwhelmingly likely that I will encounter an unbroken
succession of losses; but I do not conclude that therefore I cannot possibly win.
From a Bayesian standpoint, which we develop below, what is missing in a relative
frequency model is any way of integrating the observed frequencies with prior
assumptions about the behaviour of colliding objects or lotteries (e.g., that hitting the
coconut will often, but not always, cause it to be knocked off from the stick; that the
prior probability of winning a lottery is low but greater than zero, and so on).
Bayesian Probability Judgments
How, then, might we develop a purely Bayesian approach to making estimates
from samples? First, we suppose that people begin with a prior concerning the possible
probabilities of knocking down coconuts, winning lotteries, or other real-world events.
Following the standard Bayesian statistical practice, the natural prior distribution for
this unknown probability is so-called conjugate prior of the probabilistic process of
interest – here, for a pairwise judgment, this is the Beta distribution.
What makes the most appropriate generic prior Beta distribution is a contentious
topic. A common desideratum is that the prior reflect “ignorance” or “lack of
information”. As shown in Figure 1, a uniform distribution, Beta(1, 1), was suggested
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Figure 1 . Illustrations of Bayes’ prior, Jeffreys’ prior, Haldane’s prior, and the
symmetric Beta prior that best fits empirical data on the real-world occurrence of
probabilities. Empirical data are plotted as a histogram.
by Thomas Bayes and later adopted by Pierre-Simon Laplace in his female birth rate
analysis (Bayes, 1763; Laplace, 2012), capturing the intuition that there is no reason to
consider the case p = p1 as more likely than the case p = p2 for all possible values of
p ∈ [0, 1]. A uniform probability density function (PDF) is consistent with the
no-preference principle on p. However, this no-preference principle does not generalize
to natural monotonic transformations of p, and the desire for invariance to
transformation led to the development of Jeffreys’ prior, which in this case is the
Beta(0.5, 0.5) distribution. Finally, on the extreme end, Haldane’s prior, approaching
Beta(0, 0), represents the belief that it is equally likely that the underlying probability
is zero or one, and that it is not in-between (Jaynes, 2003).
Though Bayes’, Jeffreys’, and Haldane’s prior each have their own theoretical
justifications, we can also empirically explore what would be a good prior for
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probability estimates by looking at how often different probabilities occur in natural
language. To do so, we used the data reported in Stewart, Chater, and Brown (2006)
which collected the frequencies of a range of probability-describing phrases (e.g.,
“doubtful”, “fair chance”, “likely”) from the British National Corpus (BNC) world
edition (http://www.natcorp.ox.ac.uk). These BNC frequencies were next adjusted
so that they reflected the number of times each phrase was used to describe a
probability. Finally, Stewart et al. (2006) asked participants to report their probability
judgments for each probability-describing phrases. We used these data to plot a
histogram of the frequency of each numerical judgment in natural language in Figure 1,
and fit these data with a symmetric Beta distribution to estimate the shape of the
empirical prior. The maximum likelihood distribution was a Beta(0.27,0.27)
distribution, which falls in the range of theoretical distributions discussed above2.
For our analysis, we assume that, for simplicity, the prior is the symmetric Beta
distribution, Beta(β, β). This distribution has a single free parameter, β, and assumes
there is no a priori reason to expect a bias toward one or the other outcome of a
pairwise event. This prior is then continuously updated in the light of samples, whether
retrieved from memory or generated by simulation. So, for example, as the number of
missed throws at the coconut shy increases, the more we suspect that we have poor aim:
the posterior probability distribution of hitting the coconut shifts in favor of lower
probabilities of hitting the coconut. How do we then convert this posterior distribution
over these pairs of events into a single judgment (note that this is a so-called
second-order probability: a probability distribution over probabilities)? The natural
approach is to take the expected value of this distribution: roughly, the average of all of
the possible coconut-hitting accuracies, each weighted by its posterior probability.
Fortunately for this Bayesian model, the expected value has a simple form: it is
the same as relative frequency after adding a “psuedo-count” of β to each of the two
possible outcomes. If we assume β = 1, we get the following estimates for our example
2Not all analyses of the probabilities of real-world events fall in this range. Fennell and Baddeley
(2012) analyzed blog posts and found that the distribution of the probabilities of good and bad events
occurring followed a Beta distribution with parameter much greater than one.
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above when Nhit = Nhit and knocked off = Nthrown = 1 and Nhit and not knocked off = 0 (see
Appendix A for derivation of the formulas):
PˆBS(hit) =
Nhit + β
Nthrown + 2β
= 23 (4)
PˆBS(hit ∩ knocked off) = Nhit and knocked off + β
Nthrown + 2β
= 23 (5)
PˆBS(hit ∩ ¬knocked off) = Nhit and not knocked off + β
Nthrown + 2β
= 13 (6)
This set of judgments from the Bayesian reasoner is not coherent (e.g.,
PˆBS(hit) 6= PˆBS(hit ∩ knocked off) + PˆBS(hit ∩ ¬ knocked off)), as it is for relative
frequency. However, as discussed above coherence is inherently unlikely for a sampling
agent: different judgments will be made from different set of samples. For the Bayesian
reasoner, this decrement in coherence leads to an improvement in a quantity we believe
to be more important to a sampling agent: accuracy. Indeed, the Bayesian reasoner is
defined in such a way that it will of course be more accurate if the assumed value of β is
correct. And, intuitively, it seems useful to hedge estimates in just this way: having
only seen one example of a coconut being hit, it is more reasonable to estimate that
probability to be 2/3 rather than 1.
It is also important to note that the improvement in accuracy is robust to
variation in the prior belief of probabilities (i.e., β). Relative frequency is in fact a
special case of the Bayesian sampler, assuming Haldane’s prior (i.e., β → 0). This
means that relative frequency is in fact a rather extreme assumption about what the
probabilities are: specifically the prior belief that the underlying probability is either
one or zero. If the true state of the world is closer to the value of β assumed by the
Bayesian sampler than to zero, the Bayesian sampler will produce more accurate
estimates (see Appendix C for details).
A Bayesian Sampling Model of Conservatism in Probability Judgments
We have outlined a generic Bayesian approach to probability judgment; to make
this model complete requires specifying only the prior parameter, β, and the number of
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samples, N . But how credible is this Bayesian approach as an account of human
probability judgments? How much justification is there in saying that many observed
probabilistic biases can be viewed as “traces” of the Bayesian sampling process that
underpins human probabilistic judgment?
Perhaps the most fundamental and important systematic bias in probability
judgment, which has been observed repeatedly, is conservatism: people on average tend
to avoid the extremes (i.e., values close to 0 or 1) in their probability estimates
(Edwards, 1968; Erev, Wallsten, & Budescu, 1994; Fiedler, 1991; Hilbert, 2012;
Kaufman, Lord, Reese, & Volkmann, 1949; Peterson & Beach, 1967). Conservatism is
widespread: it has both been demonstrated in the aggregation of evidence (Peterson &
Beach, 1967) and in simple probability estimates (Erev et al., 1994), though we will
focus on the latter. Indeed, many have argued that there is a cognitive mechanism that
regresses people’s estimates toward .5 (Costello & Watts, 2014; Dougherty, Gettys, &
Ogden, 1999; Erev et al., 1994; Hilbert, 2012). Specifically, the closer the underlying
subjective probability of an event A, P (A), is to 0, the more likely it is that the
estimated probability, Pˆ (A), is greater than P (A), whereas the closer P (A) is to 1, the
more likely it is that Pˆ (A) is less than P (A).
Interesting, though, the systematic “bias” of conservatism follows directly from
the Bayesian model we have outlined. As described above, the Beta distribution prior
over probabilities will moderate extreme relative frequencies, for any prior with β > 0,
as can be seen from Equation 4. Indeed, from this point of view, labelling conservatism
as a “bias” is misleading. From the point of view of frequentist statistics, it is the case
that, where the underlying subjective probability is extreme (for example, zero), then
the Bayesian approach will overestimate that probability given a sample. In frequentist
statistics, any difference between the expected value of an estimate, and the true value,
counts as a bias. But from a Bayesian point of view, this phenomenon follows from
adhering to the laws of probability when using the same generic prior for each
judgment. After all, if the underlying subjective probability to be estimated is zero, a
rational updating model should overestimate this probability from any finite sample – a
THE BAYESIAN SAMPLER 15
rational Bayesian model cannot rule out the possibility that the event has a positive
possibility, but simply has yet to occur by chance. So, from the present Bayesian
standpoint, some degree of conservatism is normatively required and hence is not
necessarily properly labelled as a bias at all.
How conservative should people be? In our generic Bayesian model, this depends
on their prior distribution, characterized by the value of the β parameter in the
symmetrical Beta distribution. Another potentially relevant factor, though, is the
degree of correlation between samples. While identical independent draws are suggested
by drawing from an urn with replacement, natural sources of data typically have
interdependencies at many scales (Gilden, 2001; Gilden, Thornton, & Mallon, 1995).
And indeed, when people are sampling, not from observation, but from memory or
mental simulation, such interdependencies will be large and unavoidable (Bousfield &
Sedgewick, 1944; Zhu, Sanborn, & Chater, 2018). To the extent that a person does not
assume independence, further conservatism is justified – if, for example, people assume
that events run in ‘streaks’, then observing an event occurring successively many times
should be weaker evidence that it is highly likely: after all, an opposite streak might be
about to start at any time. For now, we assume independence, but we will return to the
question of autocorrelated samples below.
To sum up, instead of conservatism being the result of noise (as we shall see in the
next section), we propose that it is a rational adjustment for small sample sizes. While
we assume that the samples will generally reflect the underlying probabilities
accurately, a second stage corrects for the intrinsic uncertainty in the probabilities as a
result of having a limited number of samples. This correction produces a “biased”
estimate that is, on average, more accurate than the uncorrected, unbiased estimate,
but it produces judgments that are incoherent on average as a by-product.
Our approach falls into the class of rational process models, that explain biases as
the result of the algorithm used to perform inference (Griffiths, Vul, & Sanborn, 2012;
Sanborn & Chater, 2016; Sanborn et al., 2010). Recently, this approach has been
extended to derive biases from a rational use of time or limited cognitive resources
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(Griffiths, Lieder, & Goodman, 2015; Lieder & Griffiths, 2017). The Bayesian sampler is
in the same spirit of the resource-rational framework as it aims to produce the best
possible adjustment given a limited number of samples. In addition, it’s two-stage
nature echoes work in computational neuroscience that has posited that brain regions
and even individual neurons perform Bayesian inference on the input that they receive
(Deneve, 2008; Pfister, Dayan, & Lengyel, 2010).
The Probability Theory Plus Noise (PT+N) Model
There is, though, an alternative, and arguably simpler, model of the mapping
from frequencies to probability judgments to consider – that probability regression does
not arise from Bayesian calculations, but simply from noise in the process of storing and
retrieving memories of past events. This “probability theory plus noise” (PT+N)
approach has been pursued by Costello and Watts in an important recent series of
papers (Costello & Watts, 2014, 2016a, 2017, 2019; Costello et al., 2018). The PT+N
model suggests that, for example, when recalling past throws at the coconut shy, our
memory is noisy: some failures will be mis-remembered as successes; and some successes
will be misremembered as failures. Indeed, their initial model (Costello & Watts, 2014)
makes the simplest possible assumption: that the probability of misclassification is a
fixed constant, which is the same for both positive and negative instances. If probability
judgments were determined purely by noise of this type, then each event A, and its
complements not-A, would be assigned a probability that is pulled towards .5 (varying
depending on the particular sample drawn). That is, a mix of veridical and noisy
memories will “regress” observed relative frequencies towards .5, in proportion to the
level of noise.
According to PT+N model, many “rational” patterns in the data on human
probability judgments should remain intact. Misclassifications can “flip” the
classification of items in the mental sample; but probabilities are still “read off” the
relative frequencies of items in this “modified” sample. These relative frequencies, all
derived from the same (albeit corrupted) mental sample, should therefore obey the laws
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of probability in some cases. Using this line of reasoning, Costello and Watts identify a
number of probabilistic identities that should be respected, even with “regressed”
probability judgments. For example, to choose a somewhat simpler case for illustration,
PˆPT+N(A) + PˆPT+N(¬A) = 1 still applies on average in the PT+N model: if A is a low
probability event, then there will be more switches from not-A to A than the reverse.
But each event is, nonetheless, either A or not-A, so that the sum of the relative
frequencies still sums to 1, and indeed this generally holds in human data (Tversky &
Koehler, 1994; Wallsten, Budescu, & Zwick, 1993). In addition, there are several
identities involving conditional probabilities that should always be respected by
regressed probability estimates. However, Costello and Watts also derive a number of
other identities that should not be preserved in the PT+N account. The predictions
from PT+N of both the identities that were expected to match probability theory and
those that were expected to deviate from probability theory were verified in a series of
experiments (Costello & Watts, 2014, 2016a; Costello et al., 2018)
The PT+N model, at first glance, looks like a rival to a Bayesian sampling
account because it departs from rationality in the light of putative mechanistic factors,
concerning the noisiness of memory. As we shall see, though, it turns out that a natural
Bayesian sampling model generates predictions for a wide range of judgments that are,
in expectation, identical to those of the PT+N model. However, the two approaches
diverge regarding conditional probability judgments, and as a result, for the
probabilistic identities that involve conditional probability judgments. In the next
section, we consider how the PT+N model and the Bayesian sampler capture key
empirically observed probabilistic identities. We then test the contrasting predictions of
the two models in two new experiments.
Capturing the Key Probabilistic Identities
Costello, Watts, and colleagues (Costello & Watts, 2014, 2016a; Costello et al.,
2018) developed a set of empirical probabilistic identities that involve combinations of
participants’ estimates of a pair of binary events, A and B. Participants in these
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experiments could be asked about of either single events (e.g., P (A)), conjunctions of
the events (e.g., P (A ∩B)), disjunctions of the events (e.g., P (A ∪B)), or one event
conditioned on the other (e.g., P (A|B)). A key feature of these empirical identities is
that, according to probability theory, they should all equal zero. This key feature holds
for relative frequency judgments as well – even if people are drawing a new sample for
each judgment and making their judgment according to relative frequency, on average,
all of the identities should equal zero.
Indeed, when measuring human probability judgments, some of the identities
(shown in Table 1) have been found to be equal to zero, at least in aggregate. For
example, Costello and Watts (2014) considered: 3
Zˆ1 = Pˆ (A) + Pˆ (B)− Pˆ (A ∩B)− Pˆ (A ∪B), (7)
and
Zˆ2 = Pˆ (A) + Pˆ (¬A ∩B)− Pˆ (B)− Pˆ (A ∩ ¬B). (8)
In human judgments, the two identities were found to be equal to zero on average
across events, though for individual pairs of judged events Zˆ1 was found to deviate
predictably from zero (Costello & Watts, 2017). Stronger predictions, also confirmed
experimentally, were found for a series of identities involving only simple events and
conditional probabilities: in our terminology the identities from Zˆ9 to Zˆ14 in Table 1.
These identities were found to be almost always equal to zero across many different
pairs of judged events (Costello & Watts, 2016a).
Many of other identities, by contrast, deviated reliably from zero. For example,
identities from Zˆ3 to Zˆ8 and from Zˆ15 to Zˆ18 from Table 1 were all shown to be reliably
different from zero, and in a direction implicating conservatism as the cause (Costello &
Watts, 2014, 2016a; Costello et al., 2018). This is an illustration of incoherence in
average judgments – any probabilistic identities that deviate from zero show that
average judgments violate the laws of probability and hence are incoherent.
3The identities Z1 and Z2 are given the same names in Costello and Watts (2016a), but are denoted
as X and Y respectively in Costello and Watts (2014).
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Table 1
Probabilistic identities and their predicted values from probability theory.
Identity name Identity calculation Predicted value
Zˆ1 Pˆ (A) + Pˆ (B)− Pˆ (A ∩B)− Pˆ (A ∪B) = 0
Zˆ2 Pˆ (A) + Pˆ (B ∩ ¬A)− Pˆ (B)− Pˆ (A ∩ ¬B) = 0
Zˆ3 Pˆ (A) + Pˆ (B ∩ ¬A)− Pˆ (A ∪B) = 0
Zˆ4 Pˆ (B) + Pˆ (A ∩ ¬B)− Pˆ (A ∪B) = 0
Zˆ5 Pˆ (A ∩ ¬B) + Pˆ (A ∩B)− Pˆ (A) = 0
Zˆ6 Pˆ (B ∩ ¬A) + Pˆ (A ∩B)− Pˆ (B) = 0
Zˆ7 Pˆ (A ∩ ¬B) + Pˆ (B ∩ ¬A) + Pˆ (A ∩B)− Pˆ (A ∪B) = 0
Zˆ8 Pˆ (A ∩ ¬B) + Pˆ (B ∩ ¬A) + 2Pˆ (A ∩B)− Pˆ (A)− Pˆ (B) = 0
Zˆ9 Pˆ (A|B)Pˆ (B)− Pˆ (B|A)Pˆ (A) = 0
Zˆ10 Pˆ (A|B)Pˆ (B) + Pˆ (A|¬B)Pˆ (¬B)− Pˆ (A) = 0
Zˆ11 Pˆ (B|A)Pˆ (A) + Pˆ (B|¬A)Pˆ (¬A)− Pˆ (B) = 0
Zˆ12 Pˆ (B|A)Pˆ (A) + Pˆ (A|¬B)Pˆ (¬B)− Pˆ (A) = 0
Zˆ13 Pˆ (A|B)Pˆ (B) + Pˆ (B|¬A)Pˆ (¬A)− Pˆ (B) = 0
Zˆ14 Pˆ (A|¬B)Pˆ (¬B) + Pˆ (B)− Pˆ (B|¬A)Pˆ (¬A)− Pˆ (A) = 0
Zˆ15 Pˆ (A ∩B)− Pˆ (A|B)Pˆ (B) = 0
Zˆ16 Pˆ (A ∩B)− Pˆ (B|A)Pˆ (A) = 0
Zˆ17 Pˆ (A ∩B)− Pˆ (A) + Pˆ (A|¬B)Pˆ (¬B) = 0
Zˆ18 Pˆ (A ∩B)− Pˆ (B) + Pˆ (B|¬A)Pˆ (¬A) = 0
Note. We have abbreviated the identities using Pˆ (¬A) and Pˆ (¬B) for 1− Pˆ (A) and
1− Pˆ (B). This applies to identities Z10, Z11, Z12, Z13, Z14, Z17, Z18, and did not affect
any of the model predictions nor the direction of the deviation of the identities in the
empirical results reported later.
PT+N is able to capture all of these results, at least when they are addressed
individually. As noted above, this model assumes that people estimate the probability
of some event A as in the frequentist interpretation of probability theory. The memory
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retrieval process consists of the following steps: (a) drawing a set of samples from
memory, (b) counting the number of As, and (c) dividing by the sample size. The
critical mechanism proposed by the PT+N model is that recalling samples from
memory is perturbed by random noise, so that each flag is misread with a probability of
d (Costello & Watts, 2014, 2016a). That is, there is a probability of d that an event A
will be incorrectly counted as event ¬A (or vice versa). Because the noise is applied to
samples at random, the probability of reading out event A will be:
P (read as A) = (1− d)P (A) + d(1− P (A))
= (1− 2d)P (A) + d (9)
which is the sum of (a) the probability of a sample originally marked as A and not
corrupted by the noise and (b) the probability of a sample originally marked as ¬A but
corrupted by the noise. Average estimates will thus have mean value of
E[PˆPT+N(A)] = (1− 2d)P (A) + d (10)
As seen in Figure 2 (Left), the E[PˆPT+N(A)] predicted by the PT+N model is a linear
transformation of the underlying subjective probability P (A).
In a significant elaboration of the approach, the extended probability theory plus
noise model, Costello and Watts (2016a, 2017) described how the increased random
error found empirically in conjunctive (e.g., A ∩B) or disjunctive (e.g., A ∪B) events,
can explain above-chance rates of conjunction fallacies. The rate of random error is
enhanced from d (for single events) to d+ ∆d (for conjunctions and disjunctions). This
assumption is justified on the basis that combined variables (i.e., conjunctions and
disjunctions) will be noisier than individual variables (Costello & Watts, 2017). This is
also a necessary assumption for the PT+N model to predict above-chance rates of
conjunction fallacy. If the noise is higher for conjunctions, then the mean estimates for
a conjunction could be higher than the mean estimates of the simple events because
conjunctions are more strongly regressed towards 0.5 (Costello & Watts, 2017).
Therefore, the expected value of probability estimates for a conjunctive event A ∩B is:
E[PˆPT+N(A ∩B)] = (1− 2[d+ ∆d])P (A ∩B) + [d+ ∆d] (11)
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Similarly, the expected value of probability estimates for a disjunctive event A∪B
is:
E[PˆPT+N(A ∪B)] = (1− 2[d+ ∆d])P (A ∪B) + [d+ ∆d] (12)
If the increased error, ∆d, is equal to zero, then identities Zˆ1 and Zˆ2 are predicted to
have an expected value of zero: there is an equal number of positive and negative terms,
so that the average deviations introduced by noise cancel out. The small empirical
deviations from zero are then accounted for by values of ∆d greater than zero. Likewise,
deviations of identities of Zˆ3 to Zˆ8 from zero are predicted because there are more
positive terms than negative terms, so the aggregate deviations are greater than zero.
Details of these predictions, as well as model predictions for the other identities are
given in Appendix D.
Second, to account for conditional probability estimations, the PT+N model
assumes that people: (a) draw a set of samples from memory, (b) count the number of
As that are also Bs, and (c) divide by the sample size (i.e., the number of Bs). For
conditional probabilities, both events A and B are independently subject to noise d
(Costello & Watts, 2016a), so the expected value of a conditional probability estimate is
more complex than for simple events:
E[PˆPT+N(A|B)] = (1− 2d)
2P (A ∩B) + d(1− 2d)[P (A) + P (B)] + d2
(1− 2d)P (B) + d (13)
Despite the apparent complexity of Equation 13, because conditional probability
estimates are the result of the constructing the estimate from corrupted samples, it is
possible to find probabilistic identities for which PT+N and probability theory agree,
on average. For example, in Zˆ9, multiplying the two expectations
E[PˆPT+N(A|B)]E[PˆPT+N(B)] cancels the denominator of the conditional probability, as
does E[PˆPT+N(B|A)]E[PˆPT+N(A)]. Because the numerators of E[PˆPT+N(A|B)] and
E[PˆPT+N(B|A)] are the same, PT+N thus predicts that Zˆ9, on average, will be always
equal to 0, in line with probability theory. Similar reasoning means that PT+N predicts
that identities from Zˆ10 to Zˆ13 will always agree with probability theory. However, other
identities that involve conditional probabilities from Zˆ14 to Zˆ18 do not have this form so
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that, for these, PT+N can deviate from probability theory. A summary of where PT+N
matches and deviates from probability theory is given in Table 2.
Table 2
Model predictions for probabilistic identities.
Relative
Fre-
quency
PT+N
(∆d = 0)
PT+N
(∆d > 0)
Bayesian sampler
(N = N ′)
Bayesian sampler
(N > N ′)
Zˆ1 = 0 X X If P (A) +
P (B) = 1
X If P (A) + P (B) =
1
Zˆ2 = 0 X X If P (A) =
P (B)
X If P (A) = P (B)
Zˆ3, Zˆ4, Zˆ5, Zˆ6, Zˆ7, Zˆ8 =
0
X No No No No
Zˆ9 = 0 X X X If A ⊥ B or P (A∩
¬B) = P (¬A∩B)
If A ⊥ B or P (A∩
¬B) = P (¬A∩B)
Zˆ10, Zˆ11, Zˆ12, Zˆ13 = 0 X X X If A ⊥ B or P (A∩
B) = P (¬A∩¬B)
If A ⊥ B or P (A∩
B) = P (¬A∩¬B)
Zˆ14, Zˆ15, Zˆ16, Zˆ17, Zˆ18 =
0
X No No No No
Note. A checkmark indicates that this model always agrees with probability theory for
particular identities, and A ⊥ B denotes that A,B are independent.
The Bayesian Sampler Captures Key Probabilistic Identities
As we noted above, while a pure relative frequency model will produce the correct
probabilities from relative frequencies in the limit, it can produce extreme conclusions
where the number of samples is small. Recall that drawing a single sample from the
posterior of the event can only lead to relative frequencies of either 0 or 1. But, of
course, it seems unreasonable to report that an event has a probability of 0 or 1 based
on a single sample. The Bayesian sampler moderates such extreme conclusions, leading
to conservatism.
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Figure 2 . An illustration of model behaviors for PT+N (Left) and Bayesian sampler
(Right), showing the underlying subjective probability of a simple event A (x-axis) and
the expected probability estimates (y-axis) predicted by models. This link holds here
when the Bayesian sampler uses a generic prior of Beta(1, 1).
For simplicity, and paralleling model predictions with PT+N, we use a symmetric
Beta distribution, Beta(β, β), as the generic prior on all probability estimates. The
Beta distribution is a conjugate prior probability distribution for the Bernoulli and
binomial distributions. It is defined on the interval [0, 1], which is, of course, also the
interval for probability estimates. This prior reflects the degree of belief placed on every
possible probability estimate, ranging from 0 to 1.
We now consider how people would respond to the incoming samples from the
underlying subjective probability P (A). Given N samples collected, the Beta prior
distribution should be updated in light of these new samples according to Bayes’ rule.
Formally, let S(A) denote the number of samples of event A and F (A) denote the
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number of samples not marked as event A. According to the Bayesian sampler account,
people will have a posterior probability for probability estimates that is distributed
according to Beta(β + S(A), β + F (A)). We assume that people then report the mean
of their posterior distribution as their probability estimate. For any x ∼ Beta(a, b), we
have the mean of x : E[x] = a
a+b . Therefore, the probability estimate is a simple linear
transformation of the number of success,
PˆBS(A) =
S(A)
N + 2β +
β
N + 2β , (14)
and the expected value of the probability estimate is:
E[PˆBS(A)] =
N
N + 2βP (A) +
β
N + 2β . (15)
Interestingly, comparing Equation 10 and 15, we see that this expected value is
the same as the expected value from PT+N for this event, as long as the follow “bridge
condition” holds:
d = β
N + 2β , (16)
In fact, because the two parameters β and N are not individually identifiable from the
mean estimates, the mean predictions of the Bayesian sampler can be rewritten in terms
of d, and are in fact identical to those of PT+N. This bridge condition generalizes the
relationship between a Beta(1,1) prior and d shown by Costello and Watts (2019) to a
much wider range of priors, demonstrating how β and N trade off to produce various
values of d.
Likewise, for conjunctive and disjunctive estimates, the Bayesian sampler uses the
same prior distribution. However, because people have to evaluate two statements from
every sample to determine if a conjunction or disjunction is true, which seems
computationally more demanding, we allow for the possibility that a fixed amount of
sampling time results in fewer samples N ′ for conjunctions and disjunctions, where
N ′ < N ,
E[PˆBS(A ∩B)] = N
′
N ′ + 2βP (A ∩B) +
β
N ′ + 2β . (17)
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E[PˆBS(A ∪B)] = N
′
N ′ + 2βP (A ∪B) +
β
N ′ + 2β . (18)
Assuming that N ′ < N also allows the Bayesian sampler to explain the empirical
observation that estimates of conjunctions and disjunctions are more variable than
estimates of simple probabilities (Costello & Watts, 2017; Howe & Costello, 2017; Zhao,
Shah, & Osherson, 2009). As PT+N allows for additional noise in conjunctive and
disjunctive estimates if ∆d > 0, and we again arrive at equivalent mean predictions for
the Bayesian sampler assuming that as long as the following “bridge condition” holds:
d+ ∆d = β
N ′ + 2β , (19)
Because these two parameters β and N ′ are also not individually identifiable from the
mean estimates, the mean predictions of the Bayesian sampler are also identical to
those of PT+N for conjunctions and disjunctions.
PT+N and the Bayesian sampler make identical mean predictions for simple
events, conjunctions, and disjunctions, and so the two model make identical predictions
for many of the combined probabilistic identities as well. Identities Zˆ1 to Zˆ8 are
combinations of simple events, conjunctions, and disjunctions, so the average results of
these identities that have been well captured by PT+N are captured equally well by the
Bayesian sampler.
Where Bayesian Sampler and PT+N Differ: Conditional Probability
Estimates
The Bayesian sampler and PT+N models do not make identical predictions for
every average estimate however: the two approaches make distinct predictions for
average conditional probability estimates4. PT+N has a constructive account of
conditional probabilities: for PˆPT+N(A|B), both the event B that is conditioned on and
the event A under consideration are sampled, a noisy process is applied to reading both
4Here we consider the noisy frequentist approach to conditional probability estimates presented in
Costello and Watts (2016a). It is, however, possible to conceive of a different noise model which would
predict mean values equivalent to those of the Bayesian sampler. We explore this issue further in the
General Discussion.
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variables, then the ratio is taken of those read as both A and B over those read as B
(Costello & Watts, 2016a). The ratio of two noisy estimates will be noisier than either
estimate alone, implying that conditional probability estimates will be relatively noisy.
The Bayesian sampler, however, takes a different approach to conditional
probability. Returning to the example of the coconut shy, our simulated or remembered
throws at the coconuts must be conditioned on a range of variables: what are the sizes
of the coconuts, how firmly the coconuts are attached, who is throwing, etc. Simulating
from the joint distribution of all of these conditioned variables and constructing a
frequentist estimate would be a very inefficient process: of all the simulations run, only
a very few would actually apply to the estimates that need to be made. By contrast,
the Bayesian sampler assumes that conditional probabilities are treated the same as any
other kind of probability, and because only one variable needs to be checked when
evaluating the samples, we make the simplifying assumption that the same number of
samples, N , is drawn as for simple events. Therefore, the average predicted conditional
probabilities of the Bayesian sampler are the same as those for simple events, which
differs from the predictions of PT+N:
E[PˆBS(A|B)] = N
N + 2βP (A|B) +
β
N + 2β . (20)
Despite this difference, there are many situations in which the conditional
probability predictions of PT+N and the Bayesian sampler are identical. If, for example,
underlying subjective probability of event B is 1, then both PT+N and the Bayesian
sampler reduce to their average predictions for P (A), which are identical. Also, if A and
B are independent, then both PT+N and the Bayesian sampler also reduce to their
average prediction for P (A), which are again identical (as shown in Appendix D).
However, when these conditions do not hold, the PT+N and Bayesian sampler do
make distinguishable predictions for the probabilistic identities in which conditional
probabilities are involved (see Table 1: from Zˆ9 to Zˆ18) In particular, even if ∆d > 0,
the PT+N model predicts that the expected values of Zˆ9 to Zˆ13 should be strictly equal
to 0 (Costello & Watts, 2016a), whereas the Bayesian sampler predicts that these values
can be different from 0. Past empirical work has shown that for a range of events these
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identities are very close to 0, but the pairs of events were not chosen to distinguish the
two models. It is possible that the identities could deviate from 0 for events that have a
high level of dependence.
As shown in Table 2 and Appendix D, whether the Bayesian sampler predicts that
the expected values of these identities are equal to, smaller than, or greater than zero
depends on the underlying subjective probabilities themselves, and not on prior beliefs
(β) or the number of samples drawn (N). In particular, if there is a strong positive
correlation between A and B and both are low probability events, then Zˆ10 to Zˆ13
should be positive. Conversely, if there is a strong positive correlation between A and B
and both are high probability events, then Zˆ10 to Zˆ13 should be negative. These
predictions naturally lead to an empirical test of whether PT+N or Bayesian sampler
provides a better account of conditional probability judgments.
Experiment 1
Here we use a standard paradigm developed by Costello and Watts for eliciting
probability judgments: estimating the chance of particular weather events on a random
day. Past work in this paradigm has used a large number of pairs of weather events
involving descriptors such as cloudy, icy, warm, etc. Instead of testing a wide range of
pairs of events as in past work, here we focus on two pairs of events that satisfy our
desiderata for testing the different accounts of conditional probability. For the pair of
positively correlated low-probability events, we selected the weather descriptors “icy”
and “frosty”. The pair of positively correlated high-probability events was more
challenging to find, and we decided upon “normal” and “typical” as our weather
descriptors.
Method
Participants. Fifty-nine participants (7 males, 52 females, aged between 17 and
31) were recruited through Student Research Experience Subject Panel, University of
Warwick, and completed the 30-minute experiment in exchange for course credit.
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Relative Frequency
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Figure 3 . Human probability estimates and model predictions. (A) Mean probability
estimates and 95% confidence intervals across participants. The overlaid dots are
best-fitting model predictions generated by the most general form of each model (red
dot: the Bayesian sampler, green square: the Relative Frequency model, and blue
triangle: the Probability Theory plus Noise model). (B) The mean of the probabilistic
identities from Zˆ1 to Zˆ18 with 95% confidence intervals across participants. The overlaid
dots are best-fitting model predictions for models fit to the mean estimates in (A).
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Procedure. Participants were instructed to estimate the probability of a series
of weather-related queries, by typing in integers in the range of [0, 100], which were
framed as percentages instead of probabilities. There were two pairs of weather
descriptors: {icy, frosty} and {normal, typical}. For each weather pair, we gave all of
the 20 possible unique probability queries (see horizontal axis of Figure 3A), resulting in
40 unique queries in total. Each set of 40 queries formed a block and within each block
their order of appearance was shuﬄed randomly. Participants were asked to complete
three blocks, so that, for each unique query, participants produced three repeated
estimates in total.
We adopted very similar questions to those from the experiments of Costello and
Watts (2014, 2016a), asking people for their estimated probability of weather events.
For simple events, conjunctions, disjunctions and their negations, the query was
presented in the format of “What is the probability that the weather will be [some event]
on a random day in England?”. To decrease chances of misinterpretation with events
containing a single negation, the negative term in these conjunctive and disjunctive
events was always placed after the positive term: for instance, a weather event was
allowed to be “icy and not frosty” or “frosty and not icy”, but was not allowed to be
“not frosty and icy” nor “not icy and frosty”. For conditional probabilities such as
P (A|B), the query was presented in the format of “If the weather in England is [B] on a
random day, what is the probability that weather will also be [A] on that same day?”.
Results and Discussion
Mean Probability Estimates. The mean probability estimates across blocks
and participants are shown as bars in Figure 3A1 and 3A2 for all 20 unique queries
involving {icy, frosty} and all 20 unique queries involving {normal, typical} respectively.
Probabilistic Identities. All the combined probability identities should be zero
if people’s probability judgments are fully coherent. Because, on average, judgments
made of samples via relative frequency follow the laws of probability theory (i.e., an
unbiased estimate of underlying subjective probability), relative frequency also predicts
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Table 3
Summary of t-tests and Bayes Factors for key probabilistic identities: Z10 to Z13 of
Experiment 1.
Null hypothesis {icy, frosty} {normal, typical}
t(58) p Bayes Factor t(58) p Bayes Factor
Zˆ10 = 0 2.85 .006 5.52 -4.79 <.001 1552
Zˆ11 = 0 4.67 <.001 1051 -.533 .596 .163
Zˆ12 = 0 4.02 <.001 132 -3.91 <.001 97.8
Zˆ13 = 0 5.50 <.001 17777 -3.24 .002 14.6
Note. P-values less than .05 and Bayes factors greater than 3 are highlighted, which
respectively indicate significant evidence against the null hypothesis and substantial
evidence in favour of the alternative hypothesis that an identity is different from zero.
The Bayes factors were computed using a Jeffrey-Zellner-Siow prior with the scale on
effect size equalling the default value of .707 (Rouder, Speckman, Sun, Morey, &
Iverson, 2009).
that expected values of all identities are equal to zero (see Figure 3B green squares).
The mean values of the probabilistic identities (from Zˆ1 to Zˆ18: see Table 1 for
details) for both weather pairs are shown as bars in Figure 3B1 and 3B2. Probabilistic
identities were first computed for each participant based on their average responses to
the relevant queries. The average for each identity is then the average across
participants for that identity.
In agreement with previous work, not all of the identities were equal to zero; this
indicates that people’s probability estimates are not coherent. Whether samples are
corrupted by noise (as in the PT+N model) or tempered through Bayesian inference (as
in the Bayesian sampler), the predicted mean values of an identity can differ from zero
(see Table D1 for precise predictions). Here, we are particularly interested in identities
from Zˆ10 to Zˆ13, because PT+N predicts an average result of zero (Costello & Watts,
2016a) while the Bayesian sampler can predict non-zero results. For positively
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correlated variables, the Bayesian sampler predicts positive results for Zˆ10 to Zˆ13 when
the described events are low probability (e.g., {icy, frosty} weather in England), and
negative results when the described events are high probability (e.g., {normal, typical}
weather in England).
Table 3 summarizes statistical tests of whether identities Zˆ10 to Zˆ13 differ from
zero. Overall, 7 of 8 identities are different from zero using both frequentist and
Bayesian statistical conventions. In particular, all identities for {icy, frosty} are reliably
greater than 0 and all except Zˆ11 for {normal, typical} are reliably less than 0. These
systematic deviations from zero favor the Bayesian sampler, as they are predicted
neither by the PT+N or the relative frequency accounts.
Quantitative Model Comparisons. We also performed two different types of
quantitative comparison to see which model best fits the data. For both types of
comparison, we restrict the shape parameter of symmetric Beta prior in the Bayesian
sampler to be non-informative, β ∈ [0, 1], the noise parameter of PT+N,
d, d+ ∆d ∈ [0, 0.5], and the sample sizes for all models N,N ′ ∈ [1, 250]. This effectively
reduces the parametric space of Bayesian sampler comparing to the PT+N model,
because, according to the bridge condition, the equivalent ‘noise’ level for the Bayesian
sampler is now β
N+2β ∈ [0, 13 ].
Because model predictions depend on the values of underlying subjective
probabilities, which are unobservable, we allowed these probabilities to be free
parameters for all models, using three free parameters for each pair of weather events.
For example, for our task it is sufficient to know the subjective probabilities of icy and
frosty, pi,f , of not icy and frosty, p¬i,f , and of icy and not frosty pi,¬f . The fourth
probability parameter, the probability of not icy and not frosty, is a function of the first
three, p¬i,¬f = 1− pi,f − p¬i,f − pi,¬f . We can then calculate the subjective probability
of any query about a pair of events: for example, P (icy) = pi,f + pi,¬f and
P (icy|frosty) = pi,f/(pi,f + p¬i,f ). This leads to a total of six free parameters to
describe the underlying subjective probability parameters of both {icy, frosty} and
{normal, typical}.
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Figure 4 . Posterior probabilities of models for individual participants in Experiment 1.
Each stacked bar represents the split across models of the approximate posterior
probabilities for one participant. 67.80%, 1.69%, and 30.51% participants can be best
described by the Bayesian sampler (combined over the two variants), relative frequency,
and PT+N models (combined over the two variants) respectively.
Fitting the Mean Responses of Individuals. For the first type of
quantitative comparison, we fit the five models (i.e., relative frequency, and the simple
and more complex versions of both the Bayesian sampler and PT+N) to the means of
all probability queries at the individual level. We chose here to fit the models to mean
judgments rather than to each raw judgments to avoid having to specify additional
processes for each model, such as mechanism for how participants round their
probability estimates, as empirically participants often (but not always) round their
estimates to the nearest .05 or .10 (Budescu, Weinberg, & Wallsten, 1988; Wallsten et
al., 1993).
The best-fitted participants for each model are shown in Figure 4. Relative
frequency is, on average, equivalent to probability theory and thereby has only the
above-mentioned six free parameters describing the underlying subjective probabilities.
The simple version of PT+N includes an additional parameter for the degree of random
noise, d (Costello & Watts, 2014, 2016a), while the more complex version has additional
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noise, ∆d > 0, for conjunctions and disjunctions (Costello & Watts, 2017). The simple
version of the Bayesian sampler includes two additional parameters: the β parameter
and the sample size N . The more complex version of the Bayesian sampler also includes
a smaller sample size, N ′ < N , for conjunctions and disjunctions. Note that fitting to
the mean probability estimates effectively removes one degree of freedom from the
Bayesian sampler because β,N,N ′ are not individually identifiable.
We fit the five candidate models to the data, using a differential evolution
algorithm (Storn & Price, 1997), minimising the squared error between the mean model
predictions and the data. The mean squared errors (MSEs) of each fitted model were
then translated into BIC values, and then BIC weights, which approximate the
posterior probability of each model assuming each model was equally likely before the
experiment (Kass & Raftery, 1995; Wagenmakers & Farrell, 2004). BIC values and
weights do include a complexity penalty for the number of parameters (e.g., the
one-parameter difference between the simple and more complex versions of the Bayesian
sampler), but are unable to correct for differences in model complexity that arise from
restrictions being placed on a parameter (e.g., that the equivalent ‘noise’ level for the
Bayesian sampler is more restricted than it is for PT+N). For each individual, we
average the BIC weights for the simple and complex versions of the Bayesian sampler,
and average the BIC weights for the simple and complex versions of PT+N, to produce
a composite approximate posterior probability for each of these models that effectively
puts equal prior probability on the simple and complex variants of each of these models.
Looking at individuals, 67.80% (40 out of 59) participants were best explained by the
Bayesian sampler, the remaining 1.69% (1 out of 59) and 30.51% (18 out of 59)
participants were best explained by the relative frequency and PT+N models
respectively (see Figure 4). Of the 58 participants best explained by either the Bayesian
sampler or PT+N, there significantly more participants best explained by the Bayesian
sampler than predicted by chance (two-tailed binomial test, p = .005). We also
calculated the protected exceedance probability, a more sophisticated measure of
whether a model is fitting a preponderance of participants, which takes into account the
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Figure 5 . (A) Minimised Wasserstein distances between model predicted distributions
and individual judgments of Experiment 1 vary with the maximum number of samples
allowed for each individual for the Bayesian sampler (red) and PT+N (blue). Error bars
are 95% confidence interval across participants. The smaller the Wasserstein distance,
the better the model in explaining distributions of raw judgments. (B) Best-fitting
model parameters for the Bayesian Sampler with median values across participants are
displayed in red. (C) Best-fitting model parameters for the Probability Theory plus
Noise model with median values across participants are displayed in red.
relative evidence for each model for each participant (Rigoux, Stephan, Friston, &
Daunizeau, 2014). The protected exceedance probability, where closer to 1 indicates one
model is fitting more participants than the others, was .9994 for the Bayesian sampler.
Figure 3 displays the mean model behavior based on the most general form of
models. The Bayesian sampler closely matched the empirical mean judgments in almost
all cases, with the exception of the two questions about disjunctions that involved one
negated event, which we discuss further below.
Fitting the Raw Reponses of Individuals. Our second quantitative model
comparison method contrasted the Bayesian sampler and PT+N on the raw judgments
of individual participants. Because relative frequency, the Bayesian sampler, and PT+N
are all discrete models that often predict that only a subset of responses are made, the
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likelihood-based methods used in our first analysis can no longer be used for raw
responses they are not robust to rounding or typing errors. We instead use Wasserstein
distances, commonly used in machine learning to compare discrete distributions
(Frogner, Zhang, Mobahi, Araya, & Poggio, 2015), to quantify the discrepancy between
model predicted distributions and individual judgments (see Appendix E for a detailed
description of the method).
There are advantages and disadvantages to fitting raw judgments in this way.
Disadvantages include the inability to determine how much more likely one model is
than another for an individual, that we do not have a method for correcting for
differences in model complexity, and that this analysis is very computationally
expensive, particularly when computing PT+N’s prediction distribution for conditional
probabilities. Because of the lack of complexity penalty, we only compare the more
complex Bayesian sampler and more complex PT+N models as the simpler versions will
always perform less well. The advantages are, however, that we can compare the
predicted distributions of the model to the data, and that the β, N , and N ′ parameters
are all identifiable in raw responses, so we can restrict these values explicitly. We
enumerated 35 prominent sample sizes in the range of [1, 250], with increased spacing
between selected values at the larger sample sizes because the differences between the
predictions are smaller for larger sample sizes. Then we minimised the Wasserstein
distance for both the Bayesian sampler and PT+N models with the sample size
parameter fixed at the selected values. Finally, in Figure 5A, we show the performance
of the Bayesian sampler and PT+N when the sample sizes were restricted to be less
than or equal to the value on the horizontal axis, meaning that increasing the maximum
sample size can only improve the fit, though individuals can of course be best fit with a
smaller-than-maximum number of samples. When the maximum sample size is more
restricted (N ≤ 17), the Bayesian sampler explains participants’s data better than
PT+N, but the models perform very similarly when sample sizes are fairly unrestricted.
Similarly, for the more restricted sample sizes, the Bayesian sampler better fit
significantly more participants than the PT+N model (two-tailed binomial test when
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maximum sample size is 17, p = .004), while the proportions of best-fitted participants
for either model are non-significant from 50% for larger sample sizes (two-tailed
binomial test when maximum sample size is 237, p = .435). In Figures 5B and 5C we
show the best-fitting parameters for each model (without restricting sample size),
though should caution that one of the implications of Figure 5A is that a range of
parameter values may fit almost equally well to the data.
This method provides a complementary view of the data to the probabilistic
identities and fits to the mean estimates for each individual. Both of the other methods
suggest that the Bayesian sampler’s formulation of conditional probabilities is a better
model of the data. The fits to the raw estimates show the Bayesian sampler performing
better when sample sizes are restricted to be small, but having performance
indistinguishable to that of PT+N when sample sizes were less restricted. As the fits to
the raw estimates take into account the predicted response distribution in addition to
the predicted mean responses, this could reflect a real advantage for the raw response
distributions predicted by PT+N which compensates for the worse fit to the means.
Alternatively, because a large number of samples needed to be allowed to equate the
two models’ performance, PT+N’s equally good performance could also be an artefact
of fitting the models to responses that were rounded by the participants. Rounding can
both reduce the variability of responses and bias the means (e.g., suppose that a
participant would have given responses evenly distributed between 65 and 70, but
rounds and always respond with 70), and the two models may well differ in their ability
to cope with rounded data. A large number of samples allows the Bayesian sampler to
produce a consistent response, but causes its mean predictions to converge with
probability theory. PT+N, however, can produce consistent responses that deviate from
probability theory, and so could potentially better match the results of rounded
responses.
Excluding Disjunctive Responses. We chose to ask participants about
highly correlated events in order to qualitatively distinguishing between the models, but
it is possible that participants treat these events differently than other pairs of events.
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As pointed out by a reviewer, these events might have caused participants to interpret
some kinds of disjunctions differently than they normally would. In particular, the or
operation could be seen as providing alternative labels of a single event in cases of
synonymous labels. For example, when people state that this curve is Gaussian or
bell-shaped, the bell-shaped description is actually intended to provide a further
explanation of the Gaussian, rather than being the second argument to a disjunction.
This kind of pragmatic inference could potentially explain the mismatch of all of the
models to the disjunctions involving one negation, as shown in Figure 3. To check
whether this possibility influenced our conclusions, we therefore performed a fit to the
mean responses of individuals, but excluding all eight disjunction queries. The fitting
results without disjunctions were similar to the fitting results from the whole dataset:
62.71%, 3.39%, and 33.90% participants can be best described by the Bayesian sampler,
relative frequency, and PT+N models respectively though the evidence for the best
model is weaker (two-tailed binomial test for whether the Bayesian sampler best-fits
more than half of participants, p = .033, and protected exceedance probability of the
Bayesian sampler was .9595). Regarding the qualitative model comparisons on the key
probabilistic identities, Zˆ10 to Zˆ13, these do not involve any disjunction judgments (see
Table 1), so these conclusions remain unaffected by this concern.
Experiment 2
While the highly dependent events in Experiment 1 were useful for performing
qualitative tests between different formulations of conditional probabilities, questions
about the disjunctive events seemed more open to misinterpretation, which are not
captured by any sampling-based model. Therefore, in order to better generalise to the
more commonly-used probability estimation tasks in which the two events are at most
mildly dependent, we compare the models in another experiment using the same design,
but with two weather-pairs that are less strongly dependent.
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Method
Participants. Another eighty-four participants (21 males, 62 females, and 1
non-disclosed gender, aged between 17 and 29) were recruited through Student Research
Experience Subject Panel, University of Warwick, and completed the 30-minute
experiment in exchange for course credit.
Procedure. The design was the same as in the first experiment, except that
participants were asked about three different pairs of different weather events: {cold,
rainy}, {windy, cloudy}, and {warm, snowy}. All of the 20 possible unique probability
queries was asked (see horizontal axes of Figure 6A). This results in a total of 60 unique
queries, which forms one block. Participants were asked to complete three blocks and
the queries within each block were randomly shuﬄed.
Analysis. Chronologically this experiment was performed first, before we
understood either the desirability of highly dependent events for distinguishing models,
or that highly dependent events might induce pragmatic reasoning. As a result, this
experiment includes both mildly and highly dependent events. In order to complement
the first experiment we report only the results for the mildly dependent events {cold,
rainy} and {windy, cloudy}, and do not analyse the data from the highly dependent
events {warm, snowy}.
Results and Discussion
Mean Probability Estimates. In Figure 6A1 and 6A2, the mean probability
estimates averaged across blocks and participants for {cold, rainy} and {windy, cloudy}
are displayed.
Probabilistic Identities. The general patterns of mean probabilistic identities
are shown in Figure 6B1 and 6B2, and they resemble the pattern we observed in
Experiment 1. Not all probabilistic identities were equal to zero; this once again
replicates previous results and indicates that people’s probability estimates are
incoherent. However, unlike in Experiment 1, there was evidence that Zˆ10 to Zˆ13 were
equal to zero for these mildly dependent weather-pairs based on the Bayes factors (see
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Table 4
Summary of t-tests and Bayes Factors for key probabilistic identities: Z10 to Z13 of
Experiment 2.
Null hypothesis {cold, rainy} {windy, cloudy}
t(83) p Bayes Factor t(83) p Bayes Factor
Zˆ10 = 0 .240 .811 .124 -.298 .767 .126
Zˆ11 = 0 -.946 .347 .185 -1.42 .161 .314
Zˆ12 = 0 .073 .942 .121 -2.18 .032 .880
Zˆ13 = 0 -1.06 .291 .208 -.069 .945 .121
Note. P-values less than .05 are highlighted, which indicate significant evidence against
the null hypothesis. The Bayes factors were computed using a Jeffrey-Zellner-Siow prior
with the scale on effect size equalling the default value of .707 (Rouder et al., 2009). No
Bayes factor is greater than 3, suggesting no substantial evidence in favour of the
alternative hypothesis that an identity is different from zero.
Table 4), though the results were non-diagnostic for Zˆ12 for {windy, cloudy}. This is the
predicted result from PT+N, and replicates the result for the key identities for the
event pair {windy, cloudy} in Costello and Watts (2018). In contrast the Bayesian
sampler does not predict that the key identities will be exactly zero unless the events
are perfectly independent, but its predictions will be closer to zero for these mildly
dependent events than for the highly dependent events in Experiment 1 (see Table 2).
Looking at the values predicted for the key identities from the quantitative fits of the
Bayesian sampler (see Figure 6B1 and 6B2), we can see very small negative predictions
for the key identities: all of the predicted mean deviations lie within the 95% confidence
intervals of data. Overall, for these mildly dependent events, the identities Zˆ10 to Zˆ13 do
not seem able to distinguish between PT+N and the Bayesian sampler.
Quantitative Model Comparisons. We performed the same two quantitative
model comparisons as we did in Experiment 1.
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Figure 6 . Human probability estimates and model predictions. (A) Mean probability
estimates and 95% confidence intervals across participants. The overlaid dots are
best-fitting model predictions generated by the most general form of each model (red
dot: the Bayesian sampler, green square: the Relative Frequency model, and blue
triangle: the Probability Theory plus Noise model). (B) The mean of the probabilistic
identities from Zˆ1 to Zˆ18 with 95% confidence intervals across participants. The overlaid
dots are best-fitting model predictions for models fit to the mean estimates in (A).
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Fitting the Mean Responses of Individuals. Based on the MSE fits to the
mean responses of each individual, the Bayesian sampler (combined over the two
variants) best explained 61.90% (52 of 84) of participants, whereas the PT+N model
(combined over the two variants) best explained the remaining participants (see Figure
7). The proportion best fit by the Bayesian sampler was significantly higher than chance
(two-tailed binomial test, p = .038). The protected exceedance probability (where closer
to 1 is better) was .9911 for the Bayesian sampler. This result suggests that the event
pairs {cold, rainy} and {windy, cloudy} were in fact not treated as independent by
participants, as this fit measure distinguishes between the Bayesian sampler and PT+N,
unlike the results for the key probabilistic identities. The mean predictions based on
best-fitted models are shown in Figure 6, and here there is a better fit to the empirical
mean disjunctions that involved one negative event than was evident in Experiment 1.
Fitting the Raw Reponses of Individuals. We also evaluated model
performances based on how accurately their predicted distributions of probability
estimates describe distributions of raw judgments for each individual. The general
relationship between the minimised Wasserstein distance and the maximum sample size
allowed for the models is similar to the one in Experiment 1: the Bayesian sampler has
a better fit when samples are relatively few, while this advantage diminishes with more
samples allowed (see Figure 8A: two-tailed binomial test when maximum sample size is
17, p < .001). However, the individual level result is reversed when more samples are
allowed, the proportions of participants best-fitted by the PT+N model is significantly
greater than 50% when N ≥ 24 (two-tailed binomial test when maximum sample sizes
is 24, p = .021). In Figures 8B and 8C, we show the best-fitting parameters for each
model, though we should stress again that a range of parameter values may fit almost
equally well to the data.
As in Experiment 1, the combination of results across the two quantitative model
comparison methods may indicate that PT+N has a real advantage in predicting the
distribution of responses but a disadvantage in predicting the mean responses, and
PT+N’s advantage in predicting the distribution carries stronger weight in this
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Figure 7 . Posterior probabilities of models in Experiment 2. Each stacked bar
represents the split across models of the approximate posterior probabilities for one
participant. 61.90%, 0%, and 38.10% participants can be best described by the
Bayesian sampler (combined over the two variants), relative frequency, and PT+N
models (combined over the two variants) respectively.
experiment in which the differences in the mean response predictions are smaller (as the
events are only mildly dependent).
General Discussion
We have argued that sampling can play a crucial role in forming probability
judgments, and indeed is key to explaining aspects of well-known biases including some
versions of the conjunction fallacy and the unpacking effect, as well as probability
matching (Dasgupta et al., 2017; Sanborn & Chater, 2016; Vul et al., 2014). But, as we
noted above, this approach raises a neglected problem: how should sample frequencies
be converted into probability ratings? Researchers have often implicitly assumed that
probabilities can be computed taking relative frequencies, but we have seen that this
gives inappropriately extreme results for small samples.
Here we provided a generic Bayesian account of how this problem can be
addressed. It turns out, unexpectedly, that the approach perfectly mimics the
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Figure 8 . (A) Minimised Wasserstein distances between model predicted distributions
and individual judgments of Experiment 2 vary with the maximum number of samples
allowed for each individual for the Bayesian sampler (red) and PT+N (blue). Error bars
are 95% confidence interval across participants. The smaller the Wasserstein distance,
the better the model in explaining distributions of raw judgments. (B) Best-fitting
model parameters for the Bayesian Sampler with median values across participants
displayed in red lines. (C) Best-fitting model parameters for the Probability Theory
plus Noise model with median values across participants displayed in red lines.
predictions, in expectation, for many judgments from a major recent theoretical account
with strong empirical corroboration: the Probability Theory plus Noise (PT+N) model
(Costello & Watts, 2014, 2016a, 2017, 2019; Costello et al., 2018). The general approach
outlined here (whether using the Bayesian sampler or PT+N) also captures a variety of
interesting further phenomena. We have noted, though, that PT+N and the Bayesian
sampler differ regarding the estimates of conditional probabilities, and here our
empirical data favored the Bayesian sampler both qualitatively and quantitatively in
the fits to the means of individual participants, though the evidence was mixed for
quantitative fits to the distributions of responses, favoring the Bayesian sampler if we
assume the underlying samples are small, but potentially favouring PT+N if large
samples are assumed. In this section, we consider what we have learned about the
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rationality of behaviour from the success of the Bayesian sampler, discuss other
approaches to explaining biases in probability estimates, and outline how our approach
could be extended and enhanced with more realistic sampling algorithms.
How Rational Are Probability Estimates?
The unbiased estimates of probabilities produced by the relative frequency
approach are only reasonable, from a Bayesian perspective, in the limit of large samples.
But unbiased estimates are unappealing for small samples, for which they lead to
unreasonably extreme estimates. More generally, minimizing bias (e.g., the zero bias for
the relative frequency approach) will often lead to a dramatic increases in variance, and
thereby a poor correspondence with the underlying subjective probability parameters
(see Appendix C for details) (Domingos, 2000; Gelman et al., 2013; Gigerenzer &
Brighton, 2009). From a Bayesian perspective, this is because prior knowledge of
probabilities is ignored, which is of particular relevance when sample size is small.
Thus, the Bayesian sampler makes biased estimates (from the perspective of the
frequentist approach) that are more accurate because they incorporate useful prior
knowledge or partial knowledge about the estimate.
As a result, the Bayesian sampler will generally produce sets of probabilistic
judgments that are incoherent, and hence vulnerable to exploitation by adversarial
agents; by contrast, unbiased estimates of probabilities will be coherent on average and
less vulnerable to exploitation. The Bayesian sampler trades coherence for increased
accuracy, and for a sampling agent small deviations from coherence may have minimal
cost. The reason is that even for a reasoner making unbiased estimates via relative
frequency, it is extremely unlikely that the same set of samples would come to mind
every time, so that even an individual set of judgments made via relative frequencies is
unlikely to be coherent. If sampling underlies judgment, this makes coherence
unachievable, and perhaps helps explain why the brain sacrifices coherence on average
for improved accuracy (see Juslin, Nilsson, & Winman, 2009, for a related argument).
It is tempting to take the success of the Bayesian sampler in explaining people’s
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probability judgments as a sign that probability judgments are indeed as rational as
possible, assuming that people are basing their estimates on samples. However, we must
inject a note of caution, as while we have shown that using a single generic prior to
smooth the generated samples when making a probability estimate will improve that
estimate overall, it is not actually the best possible prior that can be used when it is
clear what is being judged. Indeed, as is critical to fit the empirical data, this generic
prior produces judgments that are on average incoherent. More fundamentally, using
the same Beta prior for judgments of simple events, conjunctions, disjunctions, and
conditional events actually implies that across judgments people have inconsistent prior
beliefs about the probabilities of events. For example, if people have uniform priors
(i.e., Beta(1, 1)) on the conjunctions P (A ∩B) and P (A ∩ ¬B), then they cannot
consistently also have a uniform prior on the simple event P (A), as the Bayesian
sampler would assume5.
A prior distribution that is similar to our Beta prior but results from consistent
beliefs about the probabilities of simple events, conjunctions, disjunctions, and
conditional events is the Dirichlet prior, a generalization of the Beta prior. We give
details of this prior in the Appendix B, and note that not only does it imply coherent
beliefs about the underlying probabilities when making these different kinds of
judgments, average judgments based on the posterior means are coherent as well. If an
individual was using this Dirichlet prior when making judgments in our task, then,
assuming the same number of samples for each judgment, all of their probabilistic
identities would be on average equal to zero. This, of course, does not match the data
obtained here, or in past work with these probabilistic identities, and indeed would not
predict that people make any probabilistic reasoning fallacies at above-chance rates, as
has been observed for the conjunction fallacy in particular (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983;
Wedell & Moro, 2008).
The Dirichlet prior that leads to coherent probabilistic judgments on average also
5P (A) must be equal to P (A ∩ B) + P (A ∩ ¬B), but a random variable that is the sum of two
independent uniformly distributed random variables is not itself uniformly distributed, e.g., the outcomes
of an individual die are uniformly distributed, but the sum of the outcomes of two dice is not.
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does not require complex calculations to employ (see Appendix B for details). Like the
Beta prior, the posterior mean of the Dirichlet prior is a linear function of the counts,
and the only change from the Beta prior is that the coefficients in front of the β
parameters change for each type of judgment. We surmise that perhaps this is the
reason that a Dirichlet prior is not used: the real world events that we make probability
judgments about are generally not clear-cut. There are always ambiguities about what
is being judged: is success in the coconut shy only knocking the coconut off of the stick,
or does the coconut also need to remain intact when it hits the ground? These two
different possibilities specify a simple and a conjunctive event respectively, and with
this Dirichlet prior, it would lead to employing different formulas. As a result of these
ambiguities, it may be just simpler and more robust to employ the same Beta prior for
every judgment, even if it results in judgments that are on average incoherent.
The success of the Bayesian sampler should also not be taken as evidence that
noise plays no role in probabilistic judgments, particularly given the success of PT+N
at predicting distributions of raw judgments when sample sizes were relatively
unconstrained. PT+N’s disadvantage in predicting mean conditional probabilities are
the result of a particular choice about how estimates of conditional probabilities are
made. There is likely to be a number of ways in which PT+N could be changed to
mimic the Bayesian sampler more closely. For example, PT+N could be modified to
implement a subjective Bayesian approach to estimating conditional probabilities,
directly sampling examples according to the conditional probabilities and then using a
noisy counting process as it does for simple events. The resulting model would, on
average, make the same predictions as the Bayesian sampler for every type of
probability judgment about a pair of binary events. This version of PT+N would be
indistinguishable from the Bayesian sampler in our quantitative fits to the mean
estimates of each individual, and potentially could have an advantage in predicting the
distribution of raw estimates as well. If future work proves that model most correct, our
work in this case would serve as a demonstration of the adaptive value of noisy recall
for any level of d, which generalizes the connection previously made between a
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particular level of d and the uniform prior (Costello & Watts, 2019). This kind of noisy
system could potentially arise as a result of natural selection failing to suppress this
kind of noise in the brain because it serves to make estimates more accurate (cf. Wyart
& Koechlin, 2016).
Determining the degree to which judgments are hedged as the result of an implicit
or explicit prior or as the result of noise will require a much more extensive
investigation than the studies outlined above. Moreover, the method we used to fit the
distributions of raw judgments for each individual has a number of weaknesses, and
closer examination of the distributions of responses that each model predicts will be
needed. There is at least one key difference in the predicted distributions that will be
interesting to investigate. PT+N predicts that adding noise will cause mean judgments
to be pushed away from the boundaries (i.e., 0 and 1), but that there will still be a
number of extreme estimates. The Bayesian sampler, by contrast, predicts very few
extreme judgments because both the mean and individual judgments will be pushed
away from the boundaries. One suggestive observation is that people tend to avoid
boundaries when using Likert scales, a phenomenon that has been argued to arise
because people make estimates using the mean of posterior distribution (Douven, 2017).
This is qualitatively consistent with the Bayesian sampler, though establishing whether
the observed level of extreme estimates implicates noise or adjustment due to use of a
prior will require careful quantitative modelling to determine key parameters such as
sample size, which potentially could be assisted by analyses of response times.
Other Accounts of Bias in Probability Estimates
The biases observed in probability estimates are biases of self-consistency: if
participants were able to make coherent estimates, even if their estimates show no
correspondence to real-life probabilities, then the probabilistic identities in Table 1
would hold. There have been many different accounts of why estimates are not
coherent, and performing formal model comparisons between the Bayesian sampler and
all of these alternative accounts is beyond the scope of this current paper, as many of
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the models are not precisely defined for all of the different judgments we collected in our
experiment. Instead we review a selection of qualitative evidence for and against
prominent alternative approaches below. Additionally, we take advantage of the
equivalence in mean predictions between the Bayesian sampler and PT+N for most
probabilistic judgments, as Costello, Watts, and colleagues have already carefully
compared PT+N against a wide variety of alternatives.
One approach to probabilistic biases has argued that people do follow the laws of
probability theory, but that they are interpreting the questions differently than the
experimenter intended (Bovens & Hartmann, 2003; Wolford, Taylor, & Beck, 1990). For
example, people who committed the conjunction fallacy may have confused the
conditional probability and its inverse; they were judging P (X|A ∩B) versus P (X|A),
rather than P (A ∩B|X) versus P (A|X) (Wolford et al., 1990). However, participants
make other judgments that are incongruent with this explanation (Bar-Hillel, 1991).
Along similar lines, Bovens and Hartmann (2003) suggested that people may also
consider source reliability in judging probabilities: when a source provides a likely event
(e.g., Linda is a feminist), this will cause an increase in the perceived reliability of the
source. Therefore, when the source is perceived highly reliable, it creates situations
where the probability of two events can be greater than the probability of constituent
event. However, subsequent empirical investigations did not find support for this
model’s predictions for conjunction fallacies (Jarvstad & Hahn, 2011).
Additionally, there are a variety of empirically successful models of probability
judgments in the literature such as averaging, confirmation, and the quantum
probability model, which all assume that people systematically deviate from the laws of
probability theory when making probability judgments. Averaging accounts of human
probability judgments have primarily focused on explaining estimates of conjunctions
and/or disjunctions based on known probability estimates for constituents and/or
conditional probabilities. The most successful averaging model, configural weighted
averaging, assumes that a person’s estimate of a conjunction is the weighted sum of its
constituents (e.g., Juslin et al., 2009; Nilsson, Winman, Juslin, & Hansson, 2009), so as
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a result it predicts the conjunction fallacy always occurs at chance or above chance
rates. However, empirical observations show that the conjunction fallacy can also occur
at reliably below chance rates (Costello & Watts, 2014; Fisk & Pidgeon, 1996; Wedell &
Moro, 2008), which both PT+N and the Bayesian sampler can also produce if the
separation between the underlying subjective probabilities of the conjunction and
constituent events is large enough (Costello & Watts, 2016b). Additionally, configural
weighted averaging has not yet been adapted to make predictions about conditional
probability judgments, so its explanatory scope is currently narrower than the Bayesian
sampler.
The quantum probability model assumes that human probabilistic reasoning
follows the laws of quantum probability when estimating event probabilities for simple,
conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditionals (Busemeyer, Pothos, Franco, & Trueblood,
2011; Wang & Busemeyer, 2013). Quantum probability is equivalent to standard
probability theory when two events are “compatible” (i.e., both events can be measured
simultaneously). However, when two events are incompatible (i.e., the order of
measurement matters), quantum probability can deviate from probability theory,
producing biases in probability judgments and order effects. Costello et al. (2018)
compared PT+N with the quantum probability model on a variety of identities (e.g., Zˆ5
and Zˆ6) and demonstrated that PT+N better matched the data than the quantum
probability model. Because the Bayesian sampler and PT+N models make identical
predictions regarding the mean values of some of these identities (e.g., Zˆ5 and Zˆ6), the
Bayesian sampler also shares some of these empirical advantages over quantum
probability. However, the Bayesian sampler as defined above does not produce order
effects, which are a key focus of the quantum probability model (Wang, Solloway,
Shiffrin, & Busemeyer, 2014). In the next section, we describe how using a more
realistic sampler can introduce order effects.
Finally, Tentori, Crupi, and Russo (2013) argued that the degree of inductive
confirmation between the constituents of a conjunction primarily determines whether
people commit the conjunction fallacy. However, the degree of inductive confirmation
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and the empirical rate of conjunction fallacies have been found to be negatively
correlated, while the empirical rate was positively correlated with the difference in
probability between the conjunction and the constituent event as both PT+N (Costello
& Watts, 2016a) and the Bayesian sampler predict. A separate observation in favor of
the confirmation account is that, on average, people sometimes judge both
P (B|e ∩ A) < P (C|e ∩ A) and P (A ∩ C|e) < P (A ∩B|e) in accordance with
confirmation, an ordering reversal which is not possible to produce using a model that
simply regresses both types of judgments toward 0.5 (Crupi & Tentori, 2016; Tentori et
al., 2013). Costello and Watts (2016b) pointed out that PT+N can match these results
with the right parameters, but because the Bayesian sampler simply regresses
conditional probability judgments toward .5, the Bayesian sampler as defined above
cannot produce this result. Again, for the Bayesian sampler to capture such ordering
effects will require a richer model of the sampling process, a topic to which we now turn.
Extensions to the Bayesian Sampler
The Bayesian sampler we defined above assumes a single process in which people
sample from their posterior distribution to estimate any kind of probability. Of course,
as we suggested in the introduction, for cases involving coins, dice, roulette wheels, that
people may use a qualitative reasoning process to produce precise estimates with less
work than sampling would require (Kemp & Eddy, 2017). Qualitative reasoning might
also be used when answering questions about events participants believe are identical,
as other researchers have found that for identical events (e.g., water and H20 )
participants almost always produced the extreme conditional probability estimates (e.g.,
P (water | H20 ) = 1)) (Wolfe, Fisher, & Reyna, 2013; Wolfe & Reyna, 2010), and both
PT+N and the Bayesian sampler do not predict consistent extreme responses except
with extreme parameter values. Concerned about the possibility that our empirical
conclusions could have been driven by participants using qualitative reasoning, we
reanalyzed our data by adopting the very conservative criterion of excluding
participants who produced any extreme responses, and having done so we found
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qualitatively the same results (see Appendix F). Nonetheless, determining exactly how
any additional qualitative processes would work (e.g., by modifying the prior used in
the Bayesian sampler, or as a separate process for producing an estimate) and when
they would be employed is an important task for future work.
Qualitative reasoning may be a time and effort-saving process, but even solely
using a sampling process, there are ways to reduce the amount of sampling required.
Most saliently, amortization, the process of reusing samples between similar queries in
order to avoid drawing a new set of samples, can be used to reduce effort (Gershman &
Goodman, 2014). Amortization has been explored in other work on probability
estimation by Dasgupta, Schulz, Goodman, and Gershman (2018), but presents an
interesting puzzle when it comes to explaining the conjunction fallacy. In particular,
very high rates of conjunction fallacies have been demonstrated in choice tasks where
people choose whether the simple probability or the conjunction is more likely. Indeed,
these fallacy rates are often considerably higher than the rates observed in estimation
tasks like those in our experiments (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983; Wedell & Moro, 2008).
This has been explained by the quantum probability model as the result of order effects
(Busemeyer et al., 2011). If participants are able to reuse samples between queries, why
would conjunction fallacies occur at high rates (or at all) in a choice task, in which
participants could most easily reuse the same set of samples between queries? The work
of Dasgupta et al. (2018) suggests an answer to this puzzle: participants seem only able
to remember the summary statistics of samples between queries rather than the samples
themselves. This seems natural if each sample is nearly the entire state of the brain (as
argued in Sanborn & Chater, 2016), with perhaps only a small part accumulating the
relevant summary statistics. If that were the case, then it may be that sampling is done
separately for both choice and estimation. Of course that still leaves the issue of why
the rates would be higher for choice than for estimation if they are both sampled
separately, and here it may be that needing to provide a precise numerical response,
rather than make a choice, induces participants to draw a larger sample.
Another potential development of the Bayesian sampler would be to have an
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account of sample sizes, and in particular, how sample sizes might differ depending on
question complexity, rather than merely having separate free parameters for samples for
different types of questions (e.g., conjunctions of one, two, and three events, etc.). A
direction for future work is then to specify a relationship between query complexity and
sample size, and an interesting way in which to do so would be to characterize the
“cost” of various cognitive operations such as generating a sample and evaluating a
property of a sample. These costs could reflect the computational costs of sampling as
well as the opportunity of cost of continuing to sample instead of moving on to the next
task. Vul et al. (2014) specified the cost of each new sample to determine the best
number of samples for a task, and if we could specify each cognitive operation and its
respective cost, that would allow us to determine the optimal samples size for answering
queries of any complexity, using a limited number of free parameters. Using a prior over
probabilities, as the Bayesian sampler does, also enables the use of more sophisticated
stopping strategies: instead of stopping sampling at a fixed sample size, the sampling
process could be stopped adaptively once the expected cost of further sampling exceeds
its expected benefit (Zhu, Sanborn, & Chater, 2019). More generally, costs could also
be assigned to both qualitative reasoning processes and to amortization in order to
provide a basis for selecting the process used for each query (Lieder & Griffiths, 2017).
Finally, in the Bayesian sampler and the extensions discuss above, we have made
the simplifying assumption that people draw independent and identically distributed
(i.i.d) samples from their posterior distribution. But, as we touched on in the
introduction, this does not match the empirical data on how people generate
hypotheses. Instead, people generate correlated samples in which the identity of the
next sample depends on what was produced earlier. For example, in animal naming
tasks, participants who were asked to freely recall animal names as they come to mind
produced sequential recollections in which neighbouring items tended to be semantically
related (Bousfield & Sedgewick, 1944). Similar results on the autocorrelation of mental
samples have been found in repeated temporal or spatial estimation tasks (Gilden et al.,
1995).
THE BAYESIAN SAMPLER 53
These results imply that people are instead using an algorithm that generates
autocorrelated samples such as Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC: Gershman et al.,
2009; Lieder, Griffiths, & Goodman, 2012; Metropolis et al., 1953) or more complex
alternatives (Aitchison & Lengyel, 2016; Zhu et al., 2018). As noted in the last section,
rather than adjusting sample-based estimation using Bayesian inference, the order
effects predicted by quantum probability and the ordering reversal found in Tentori et
al. (2013) would instead likely need to be explained by the ways in which a realistic
sampler differs from an i.i.d. sampler: where the process starts and in the way that the
sampling process is autocorrelated. Using the properties of the autocorrelated sampler’s
start position have been used to explain many biases in probabilistic reasoning (see
Dasgupta et al., 2017; Lieder et al., 2012, for details). In our work, if participants draw
very few i.i.d. samples in answering conjunctive and disjunctive queries, this might
appear to yield the implausible prediction that they would produce very few distinct
responses (a sample of N items can only yield N + 1 outcomes). Two factors make this
unlikely to be observed experimentally. First, inevitably there will be noise in the
process of translating the results of sampling into (numerical) responses (the nature of
this noise will depend on the fine details of the experimental task). Second, estimating,
and taking account of, sample autocorrelation would lead participants to re-weight
samples appropriately6, introducing a further source of response variability.
Furthermore, other work has shown how reusing samples can explain other biases in
probabilistic judgment (Dasgupta et al., 2018), including how PT+N could produce the
6Autocorrelated samples contain less information than i.i.d samples, and hence should be weighted
differently comparing to i.i.d samples. Fortunately, there is a way to do this if the amount of autocorre-
lation is known, or can be approximated. The effective sample size can be calculated:
ESS = N1 + 2
∑∞
k=1 ρ(k)
, (21)
where N is the total number of samples and ρ(k) is the degree of autocorrelation at lag k. The auto-
correlated samples can be thus reweighted by ESS/N to be equivalent to i.i.d samples, and so will each
be weighted less than a single i.i.d. sample. Of course, the autocorrelation will not be known perfectly
if only a short sequence of samples is generated, but autocorrelation can be estimated over a lifetime of
experience.
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order effects predicted by quantum probability (Costello & Watts, 2018), which suggests
how to construct a more realistic Bayesian sampler.
The explanatory power of a more realistic Bayesian sampler can be best
illustrated through the “unpacking” effect. There are, arguably, two types of unpacking
effects: explicit and implicit. In the explicit unpacking effect, participants are asked to
judge each unpacked descriptor separately, but in the implicit effect they make a single
judgment about the unpacked disjunction. For a descriptor such as death from natural
causes, participants in the explicit unpacking task are asked to report multiple
probability judgments for unpacked descriptors such as (a) death from heart attack, (b)
death from cancer, and (c) death from other natural causes (e.g., Fox & Tversky, 1998;
Tversky & Koehler, 1994). By contrast, participants in the implicit unpacking task only
report a single probability judgment for the unpacked descriptor such as death from
heart attack, cancer, and other natural causes (Dasgupta et al., 2017; Sloman et al.,
2004). The explicit unpacking task almost always produces a subadditivity effect (i.e.,
the sum of the probability judgments of the unpacked descriptors exceeds that of the
packed descriptor) (Tversky & Koehler, 1994), whereas the implicit unpacking task can
produce both subadditive and superadditive results, depending on whether the
unpacked descriptor includes high or low probability events (Dasgupta et al., 2017;
Sloman et al., 2004). These two types of unpacking effect seem neatly to correspond to
the two kinds of mechanisms in a more realistic Bayesian sampler. The explicit
unpacking effect can be explained by PT+N, and thus a simple Bayesian sampler,
because these models autonomatically produce a subadditivity effect, as small
probabilities are overestimated (Costello & Watts, 2014). In contrast, PT+N does not
produce an implicit unpacking effect, and this has instead been explained by the
starting point of a more realistic sampling algorithm: If the sampler starts at a
low-probability example (e.g., superadditivity from an atypical unpacking), a lower
probability estimate is expected; the opposite is true when the sampler starts at a
high-probability example (e.g., subadditivity from a typical unpacking) (Dasgupta et
al., 2017; Sanborn & Chater, 2016). Adapting the Bayesian sampler to use a more
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realistic algorithm with a starting point, autocorrelated samples, and sample reuse,
requires careful analysis and empirical corroboration, but could potentially provide a
very powerful explanation of human probabilistic biases.
Summary and Conclusions
We introduced the Bayesian sampler, which assumes probabilistic judgments are
made by first generating samples from either memory or an internal probabilistic model.
However, instead of naïvely estimating probabilities using the relative frequency of
samples, the Bayesian sampler uses a generic prior over probabilities to improve the
accuracy of these estimates. The Bayesian sampler is a departure from exact Bayesian
models, because it assumes subjective probabilities are only accessible through samples,
and cannot directly be introspected. Our approach thus is a better match to the
phenomenology of making probability estimates, where it often feels that we can easily
retrieve examples, but are uncertain about our probabilistic estimates. By assuming
that people adjust for their degree of uncertainty correctly in the light of a limited
sample, we explain a variety of classic empirical biases in probabilistic judgment.
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Appendix A
Detailed Derivations of Model Predictions
In this section, we provide the detailed derivations of the relative frequency and
Bayesian sampler models that appear in the main text.
Relative frequency model
Independent and identically distributed samples are generated according to the
underlying subjective probability P (A), with the number of those marked A (i.e.,
successes S(A)) distributed as
S(A) ∼ Bin(N,P (A)), (22)
and conversely there are F (A) = N − S(A) samples marked ¬A.
Given S(A) of N samples are read as event A, the relative frequency eastimate of
the occurrence of event A is
PˆRF (A) =
S(A)
N
∼ Bin(N,P (A))
N
. (23)
As the mean of the binomially-distributed random variable S(A) is NP (A), the mean
estimate from relative frequency is thus be equal to the underlying subjective
probability: E[PˆRF (A)] = P (A).
Similarly, applied to conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditional probabilities,
relative frequency predicts average estimates are equal to their corresponding
underlying subjective probabilities. As a result, the relative frequency model, on
average, is equivalent to the predictions of probability theory.
Bayesian sampler
The Bayesian sampler puts a prior distribution over the possible probabilities, and
here we assume a symmetric Beta distribution prior: Beta(β, β). Given S(A) samples
indicating event A and F (A) indicating event ¬A, both distributed as they are for
relative frequency, the Bayesian sampler’s posterior distribution over probabilities is
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Beta(β + S(A), β +F (A)). The mean of the posterior minimizes squared error assuming
the prior is correct, and we use this as the Bayesian sampler’s probability estimate
PˆBS(A) =
S(A) + β
N + 2β ∼
Bin(N,P (A)) + β
N + 2β . (24)
Following the formalization of Equation 24, we can compute the expected value
and variance of probability estimates of the Bayesian sampler
E[PˆBS(A)] =
N
N + 2βP (A) +
β
N + 2β , (25)
V[PˆBS(A)] =
NP (A)(1− P (A))
(N + 2β)2 . (26)
Alternatively, the median of the posterior, which minimizes absolute errors, or the mode
of the posterior, which gives the most likely response, could be used as the estimate.
The average response based on the median can be approximated by replacing β in
Equation 25 by β − 1/3, and the average response based on the mode can be
approximated by replacing β in Equation 25 by β − 1. Neither of these alternative
statistics are distinguishable from the mean of the posterior in our analyses of mean
responses, though as they do tend to imply higher values of β when fitting the same
data, they may be less plausible when β is restricted.
The probability estimates of conjunctions, disjunctions, and conditional
probabilities use the same mechanism as is used for simple events. However, we assume
conjunctions and disjunctions require evaluating two variables from each sample, and
that this additional cognitive cost results in fewer samples N ′ < N drawn for each
conjunction and disjunction.
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Appendix B
Coherent (On Average) Bayesian Probability Estimates
The Bayesian sampler assumes a Beta(β, β) prior and that each judgment is the mean
of the posterior. This model produces judgments that are incoherent in the same way in
which human probability estimates are incoherent.
However, using a prior does not necessarily result in incoherent estimates. For a
2× 2 contingency table that describes the four possible outcomes of two binary
variables, there is at least one prior that produces coherent estimates: the symmetric
Dirichlet distribution, Dirichlet(β, β, β, β). This prior has a single free parameter, β,
and assumes there is no a priori reason to expect any of the outcomes to be more likely
than any other (Agresti & Hitchcock, 2005):
(
Pˆ (A ∩B), Pˆ (¬A ∩B), Pˆ (A ∩ ¬B), Pˆ (¬A ∩ ¬B)
)
∼ Dirichlet(β, β, β, β) (27)
Two properties of the Dirichlet distribution allow us to calculate the distributions
of simple events, conjunctions, and disjunctions. The aggregation property of the
Dirichlet distribution means that the sum of the elements of a Dirichlet distribution are
also Dirichlet distributed, with parameters equal to the sum of their corresponding
parameters. In addition, for two elements the Dirichlet distribution simplifies to a Beta
distribution. As a results, for simple events,
(
Pˆ (A ∩B) + Pˆ (A ∩ ¬B), Pˆ (¬A ∩B) + Pˆ (¬A ∩ ¬B)
)
∼ Dirichlet(2β, 2β) (28)
Pˆ (A) ∼ Beta(2β, 2β) (29)
Likewise, all four conjunctions have a Beta(β, 3β) prior, and all four disjunctions,
which are each the sum of three elements of the 2× 2 contingency table, have a
Beta(3β, β) prior.
To derive the distributions of conditional events, we first note that a property of
the Dirichlet distribution is that it can be constructed from the draws of independent
Gamma distributions, which are then divided by the total sum of the draws. Let us
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consider four independently distributed Gamma random variables:
x1 ∼ Gamma(β, 1), ..., x4 ∼ Gamma(β, 1), (30)
and their sum, which is Gamma distributed with shape parameter equal to the
individual shape parameter multiplied by the number of summed Gamma distributions:
X =
4∑
i=1
xi ∼ Gamma(4β, 1). (31)
As
(
x1
X
, x2
X
, x3
X
, x4
X
)
is distributed as Dirichlet(β, β, β, β), we can simply assume that
Pˆ (A ∩B) = x1/X, Pˆ (¬A ∩B) = x2/X, Pˆ (A ∩ ¬B) = x3/X, and Pˆ (¬A ∩ ¬B) = x4/X.
Conditional events are ratios, for example Pˆ (A|B) = Pˆ (A ∩B)/Pˆ (B). We can
thus write this conditional probability as x1/X
x1/X+x2/X =
x1
x1+x2 . As this is a Gamma
random variable divided by the sum of itself and another Gamma random variable, we
know that this conditional probability is also Dirichlet (more specifically Beta)
distributed:
x1
x1 + x2
∼ Beta(β, β). (32)
Thus, the priors over conditional probability estimates follow Beta(β, β) distributions.
Unlike our generic prior, however, this set of estimates produced using the
Dirichlet prior are coherent, at least assuming that all of the estimates are made using
the same sample. This is a result of each cell of the 2× 2 contingency table being
incremented by a pseudocount of β; the resulting estimates are coherent because
relative frequencies are coherent.
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Appendix C
Robustness of the Accuracy Improvements of the Bayesian Sampler
As discussed in the main text, the relative frequency model produces unbiased
probability estimates, whereas the Bayesian sampler produces biased estimates that are
more accurate, in terms of squared error, when the prior is correct. But does this hold
for a mis-specified prior? To investigate this, we conducted a simulation in which we
compared the probability estimates predicted by the relative frequency and Bayesian
sampler models, using several possible distributions of the underlying subjective
probabilities (Figure C1 horizontal axis). For this simulation, we repeatedly drew
probabilities from the true distribution, ptrue ∼ Beta(βtrue, βtrue) and for each
underlying subjective probability drew a fixed set of samples N , and then had both
models estimate the underlying subjective probability from the samples. As a measure
of performance, we computed the mean squared errors (MSE) between ptrue and
estimates produced by each model, where smaller MSEs indicate greater accuracy.
In Figure C1, we subtracted the MSE of the relative frequency model from the
MSE of the Bayesian sampler model to quantify how much more accurate the Bayesian
sampler was. It is clear to see that for a small number of samples (e.g., N = 1, 2, 3, 4),
the Bayesian sampler improves the accuracy of the estimates (providing the generic
prior is close to the true distribution) compared to relative frequency. For large number
of samples (e.g., N > 10), both models produce similar levels of accuracy. In addition,
the estimates from the Bayesian sampler are increasingly advantageous as the value of
βtrue increases. This is because the estimates of the relative frequency model are
equivalent to an estimate from the Bayesian sampler using Haldane’s prior, Beta(0, 0).
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Figure C1 . The degree of improvement in the probability estimate (vertical axis) of the
Bayesian sampler compared to relative frequency. The horizontal axis depicts the
underlying subjective probability distributions, arranged from Beta(0.1, 0.1) (most left)
to Beta(10, 10) (most right). For the Bayesian sampler, a Beta(1, 1) prior was used
throughout this figure.
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Appendix D
Mean Predictions of the Models for the Probabilistic Identities
In Table D1 we present the predicted average values of each probabilistic identity for
two versions of the Bayesian sampler (BS) and two versions of Probability Theory plus
Noise (PT+N). One version of the PT+N model, PT+N (∆d = 0), used a single level of
random noise, d, across all probability judgments, while the other version,
PT+N (∆d > 0), assumed that conjunctions and disjunctions were subject to additional
noise ∆d. Similarly, one version of the Bayesian sampler, BS (N = N ′), assumed a fixed
number of samples N across all probability judgments, while the other version, BS
(N > N ′), assumed that fewer samples N ′ were drawn for conjunctions and
disjunctions. Bridge conditions were used to make model predictions comparable.
Table D1
Summary of model predictions for mean probabilistic identities.
Mean
Identity
Model Prediction
E[Zˆ1] BS (N = N ′) 0
BS (N > N ′) 2∆d(P (A ∩B) + P (A ∪B))− 2∆d
PT+N (∆d = 0) 0
PT+N (∆d > 0) 2∆d(P (A ∩B) + P (A ∪B))− 2∆d
E[Zˆ2] BS (N = N ′) 0
BS (N > N ′) 2∆d(P (A)− P (B))
PT+N (∆d = 0) 0
PT+N (∆d > 0) 2∆d(P (A)− P (B))
E[Zˆ3] BS (N = N ′) d
BS (N > N ′) 2∆dP (A) + d
PT+N (∆d = 0) d
PT+N (∆d > 0) 2∆dP (A) + d
E[Zˆ4] BS (N = N ′) d
BS (N > N ′) 2∆dP (B) + d
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Table D1
Summary of model predictions for mean probabilistic identities.
Mean
Identity
Model Prediction
PT+N (∆d = 0) d
PT+N (∆d > 0) 2∆dP (B) + d
E[Zˆ5] BS (N = N ′) d
BS (N > N ′) 2∆d(1− P (A)) + d
PT+N (∆d = 0) d
PT+N (∆d > 0) 2∆d(1− P (A)) + d
E[Zˆ6] BS (N = N ′) d
BS (N > N ′) 2∆d(1− P (B)) + d
PT+N (∆d = 0) d
PT+N (∆d > 0) 2∆d(1− P (B)) + d
E[Zˆ7] BS (N = N ′) 2d
BS (N > N ′) 2d+ 2∆d
PT+N (∆d = 0) 2d
PT+N (∆d > 0) 2d+ 2∆d
E[Zˆ8] BS (N = N ′) 2d
BS (N > N ′) −2∆d(P (A) + P (B)) + 2d+ 4∆d
PT+N (∆d = 0) 2d
PT+N (∆d > 0) −2∆d(P (A) + P (B)) + 2d+ 4∆d
E[Zˆ9] BS (N = N ′) d(1− 2d)[P (B) + P (A|B)− P (A)− P (B|A)]
BS (N > N ′) d(1− 2d)[P (B) + P (A|B)− P (A)− P (B|A)]
PT+N (∆d = 0) 0
PT+N (∆d > 0) 0
E[Zˆ10] BS (N = N ′) d(1− 2d)[P (A|B) + P (A|¬B)− 2P (A)]
BS (N > N ′) d(1− 2d)[P (A|B) + P (A|¬B)− 2P (A)]
PT+N (∆d = 0) 0
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Table D1
Summary of model predictions for mean probabilistic identities.
Mean
Identity
Model Prediction
PT+N (∆d > 0) 0
E[Zˆ11] BS (N = N ′) d(1− 2d)[P (B|A) + P (B|¬A)− 2P (B)]
BS (N > N ′) d(1− 2d)[P (B|A) + P (B|¬A)− 2P (B)]
PT+N (∆d = 0) 0
PT+N (∆d > 0) 0
E[Zˆ12] BS (N = N ′) d(1− 2d)[P (B|A) + P (¬B) + P (A|¬B)− P (A)− 1]
BS (N > N ′) d(1− 2d)[P (B|A) + P (¬B) + P (A|¬B)− P (A)− 1]
PT+N (∆d = 0) 0
PT+N (∆d > 0) 0
E[Zˆ13] BS (N = N ′) d(1− 2d)[P (A|B) + P (¬A) + P (B|¬A)− P (B)− 1]
BS (N > N ′) d(1− 2d)[P (A|B) + P (¬A) + P (B|¬A)− P (B)− 1]
PT+N (∆d = 0) 0
PT+N (∆d > 0) 0
E[Zˆ14] BS (N = N ′) (1 − 2d)2[P (A ∩ ¬B) − P (¬A ∩ B)] + d(1 − 2d)[P (A|¬B) +
P (¬B)− P (¬A)− P (B|¬A)] + (1− 2d)[P (B)− P (A)]
BS (N > N ′) (1 − 2d)2[P (A ∩ ¬B) − P (¬A ∩ B)] + d(1 − 2d)[P (A|¬B) +
P (¬B)− P (¬A)− P (B|¬A)] + (1− 2d)[P (B)− P (A)]
PT+N (∆d = 0) (1−2d)2[P (A∩¬B)−P (¬A∩B)]+d(1−2d)[P (A)+P (¬B)−
P (¬A)− P (B)] + (1− 2d)[P (B)− P (A)]
PT+N (∆d > 0) (1−2d)2[P (A∩¬B)−P (¬A∩B)]+d(1−2d)[P (A)+P (¬B)−
P (¬A)− P (B)] + (1− 2d)[P (B)− P (A)]
E[Zˆ15] BS (N = N ′) d(1− 2d)[2P (A ∩B)− P (A|B)− P (B)] + d(1− d)
BS (N > N ′) (2d−2∆d−4d2)P (A∩B)−d(1−2d)(P (A|B)+P (B))−d2+d+∆d
PT+N (∆d = 0) d(1− 2d)[2P (A ∩B)− P (A)− P (B)] + d(1− d)
PT+N (∆d > 0) (2d−2∆d−4d2)P (A∩B)−d(1−2d)(P (A)+P (B))−d2+d+∆d
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Table D1
Summary of model predictions for mean probabilistic identities.
Mean
Identity
Model Prediction
E[Zˆ16] BS (N = N ′) d(1− 2d)[2P (A ∩B)− P (A)− P (B|A)] + d(1− d)
BS (N > N ′) (2d−2∆d−4d2)P (A∩B)−d(1−2d)(P (B|A)+P (A))−d2+d+∆d
PT+N (∆d = 0) d(1− 2d)[2P (A ∩B)− P (A)− P (B)] + d(1− d)
PT+N (∆d > 0) (2d−2∆d−4d2)P (A∩B)−d(1−2d)(P (B)+P (A))−d2+d+∆d
E[Zˆ17] BS (N = N ′) (1 − 2d)[P (A ∩ B) − P (A)] + (1 − 2d)2P (A ∩ ¬B) + d(1 −
2d)[P (A|¬B) + P (¬B)] + d2
BS (N > N ′) (2−6d−2∆d+4d2)P (A∩B)+d(1−2d)(P (A|¬B)+P (¬B))−
(1− 2d)P (A) + d2 + ∆d
PT+N (∆d = 0) (1−2d)[P (A∩B)−P (A)]+(1−2d)2P (A∩¬B)+d(1−2d)[P (A)+
P (¬B)] + d2
PT+N (∆d > 0) (2− 6d− 2∆d + 4d2)P (A ∩ B) + d(1− 2d)(P (A) + P (¬B))−
(1− 2d)P (A) + d2 + ∆d
E[Zˆ18] BS (N = N ′) (1 − 2d)[P (A ∩ B) − P (B)] + (1 − 2d)2P (B ∩ ¬A) + d(1 −
2d)[P (B|¬A) + P (¬A)] + d2
BS (N > N ′) (2−6d−2∆d+4d2)P (A∩B)+d(1−2d)(P (B|¬A)+P (¬A))−
(1− 2d)P (B) + d2 + ∆d
PT+N (∆d = 0) (1 − 2d)[P (A ∩ B) − P (B)] + (1 − 2d)2P (B ∩ ¬A) + d(1 −
2d)[P (B) + P (¬A)] + d2
PT+N (∆d > 0) (2− 6d− 2∆d + 4d2)P (A ∩ B) + d(1− 2d)(P (B) + P (¬A))−
(1− 2d)P (B) + d2 + ∆d
Note. For presentation purposes, the bridge conditions between the Bayesian sampler
and PT+N models were applied: d = β
N+2β and d+ ∆d =
β
N ′+2β . Equivalently,
∆d = (N−N ′)β(N+2β)(N ′+2β)
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Appendix E
Fitting Models to Distributions of Raw Judgments of Individuals
In the main text, we fit the mean judgments rather than individual judgments to avoid
having to specify additional processes, such as how participants round their estimates.
This is a particularly thorny technical challenge for fitting the models considered in this
paper as they all make discrete and often sparse predictions. For example, the Bayesian
sampler with N = 1 and β = 1 predicts every response will be either 1/3 or 2/3. Even if
these probability estimates were merely rounded to the nearest 0.05, the log-likelihood
of the data under these parameters becomes negative infinity. It is however worth
addressing this challenge, as the models do make different predictions for individual
judgments, and some parameters in the Bayesian sampler are only identifiable when fit
to individual judgments.
To quantify the degree of fit between individual model predictions and individual
judgments, we abandoned measures of likelihood and adopted a commonly-used
statistical distance for two discrete distributions: Wasserstein distance (e.g., Frogner et
al., 2015). Intuitively, Wasserstein distance (informally known as “earth mover’s
distance”) can be thought of as minimal amount of effort needed to change one discrete
distribution (which to assist this intuition can be thought of as a pile of dirt) into
another discrete distribution (or another pile of dirt). The smaller the Wasserstein
distance between model and data, the better the model matches the empirical
distribution. More formally, the Wasserstein distance between distributions u and v is
defined as:
W1(u, v) =
∫ 1
x=0
|U−1(x)− V −1(x)|dx (33)
where U and V are respective Cumulative Density Functions (CDFs) of u and v. In our
case, CDFs of probability estimates are restricted to lie within the interval [0, 1].
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Appendix F
Reanalyzing Results Excluding Participants Potentially Using Qualitative Reasoning
In the main text, we compared computational models based on sampling: the relative
frequency, PT+N, and Bayesian sampler models. It is, however, possible that some
participants may have adopted qualitative reasoning strategies in estimating
probabilities, which is beyond the scope of any of these sampling-based models. One
qualitative reasoning strategy, which is particularly applicable in judging the highly
dependent events of Experiment 1, is to treat the pairs of events as identical. For
example, when event A and B are treated as identical, judging P (A ∩ ¬B) would be
seen as equivalent of judging P (A ∩ ¬A) and for each question the answer would be 0.
Thus, in our experiments, judged probability estimates of 0 or 1 could be a sign that
qualitative reasoning was used, though of course individual probability judgments of 0
or 1 could be produced by a sampling-based model. Thus as a very conservative
criterion for excluding qualitative reasoning, we reanalyzed the data excluding
participants who produced any probability estimates of 0 or 1 (i.e., responses of 0 or
100) during their experimental session.
Under this exclusion rule, 19 (out of 59) participants were removed in Experiment
1, whereas 11 (out of 84) participants were removed in Experiment 2. The overall
fitting and statistical results are similar before and after exclusion. For the 40
participants who remained in the Experiment 1, 60%, 2.5%, and 37.5% were best-fitted
by the Bayesian sampler, relative frequency, and PT+N models respectively (two-tailed
binomial test for whether the Bayesian sampler best-fits more than half of participants,
p = .199, and protected exceedance probability for the Bayesian sampler was .9201).
For the key identities Z10 to Z13, 6 out of 8 were different from zero (with both p < .05
and Bayes Factor > 3) in the direction predicted the Bayesian sampler after exclusion.
For the 73 participants remained in the Experiment 2, 76.71%, 0%, and 38.36%
participants were best-fitted by the Bayesian sampler, relative frequency, and PT+N
models respectively (two-tailed binomial test for whether the Bayesian sampler best-fits
more than half of participants, p < .001, and protected exceedance probability for the
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Bayesian sampler was .9898). All of the key identities of Experiment 2 remained
indistinguishable from zero (with both p < .05 and Bayes Factor < 3) after exclusion.
